Institution share holding, executive power and payout policy
Author:
Affiliation:

Clc Number:

Fund Project:

  • Article
  • |
  • Figures
  • |
  • Metrics
  • |
  • Reference
  • |
  • Related
  • |
  • Cited by
  • |
  • Materials
  • |
  • Comments
    Abstract:

    This paper,basing on the background of China's institution investor playing the role of "shareholder-activism" and agent theory,balances of power theory,using the data from Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market,studies the correlation of institution holding,executive power and payout policy.Empirical results show that,institutions have positive influence on cash dividend policy.However executive power has negative effects on payout policy.Also,institution holding can alleviate the negative effects of executive power.In addition,the paper gives the mechanism that institution holding can reduce agency cost of managers and hence increase the payout ratio.The above empirical evidence suggests that Chinese listed companies cash dividend decisions of multilateral governance mechanisms should be introduced,including institutional investors.

    Reference
    Related
    Cited by
Get Citation

宁青青,杨宝.机构持股、管理层权力寻租与公司分红决策[J].重庆大学学报社会科学版,2017,23(4):46~55

Copy
Share
Article Metrics
  • Abstract:
  • PDF:
  • HTML:
  • Cited by:
History
  • Received:April 07,2017
  • Revised:
  • Adopted:
  • Online: May 27,2017
  • Published: