2025年4月5日 周六
Research of evolutionary game and strategy between government and enterprises in carbon emission supervision: Based on the perspective of the third party
CSTR:
Author:
Clc Number:

F272;X322

  • Article
  • | |
  • Metrics
  • |
  • Reference [1]
  • |
  • Related [20]
  • | | |
  • Comments
    Abstract:

    Strengthening carbon emission supervision is an important guarantee for realizing the government's strategic policy of "establishing an economic system with green and low-carbon recycling development". As the main factor of destroying the environment, enterprises bear the responsibility of carbon emission reduction and social supervision. Under the government's control, enterprises participate in carbon emission reduction passively, but smuggling and over-discharge have occurred from time to time. This article analyzes the relevant factors affecting corporate carbon emissions in response to government carbon emissions regulatory issues. From the perspective of third-party supervision, under the consideration of the government, enterprises and third-party supervision subjects, the evolutionary game model of government and enterprises in carbon emission regulation is established. Under the participation of the third-party supervisory body, the limited dynamic strategy choice among the government and the enterprise as well as the evolution trend of the strategic choices of the two parties under different parameters are studied, and the results are simulated by Matlab software. The results show that third-party supervision plays a significant role in the government and enterprise carbon emissions process, and can directly influence the decision-making choices of the government and enterprises. Therefore, strengthening the supervision of third parties can improve the efficiency of government supervision, ease the pressure of government supervision, reduce the cost of government supervision, and urge enterprises to comply with the emission of carbon dioxide. However, the oversight of the third party has weakened the effectiveness of government regulation. Finally, it proposes countermeasures and suggestions for the government to introduce third-party supervisory bodies more effectively.

    Reference
    [1] 王霞,徐晓东,王宸.公共压力、社会声誉、内部治理与企业环境信息披露:来自中国制造业上市公司的证据.南开管理评论,2013,16(2):82-91. 于涛,刘长玉.政府与第三方在产品质量监管中的演化博弈分析及仿真研究.中国管理科学,2016,24(6):90-96. DYCK A,VOLCHKOVA N,ZINGALES L.The corporate governance role of the media:Evidence from Russia.Journal of Finance,2008,63(3):1093-1135. 张国兴,高晚霞,管欣.基于第三方监督的食品安全监管演化博弈模型.系统工程学报,2015,30(2):153-164. 曹裕,余振宇,万光羽.新媒体环境下政府与企业在食品掺假中的演化博弈研究.中国管理科学,2017(6):179-187. 涂建明,李晓玉,郭章翠.低碳经济背景下嵌入全面预算体系的企业碳预算构想.中国工业经济,2014(3):147-160. SHENG P F,LU D.Low-carbon development and carbon reduction in China.Climate and Development,2016,8(5):472-479. CHEN C F,HAN J.Energy conservation, emission reduction and win–win development of China’s industry: 2013–2050 – MDI analysis framework based on directional distance function.Applied Economics Letters,2016,23(17):1187-1191. ZHANG L M,YANG W,YUAN Y,et al.An integrated carbon policy-based interactive strategy for carbon reduction and economic development in a construction material supply chain.Sustainability,2017,9(11):2017. ZHANG P Y,HE J J,HONG X,et al.Regional-level carbon emissions modelling and scenario analysis:A STIRPAT case study in Henan province,China.Sustainability,2017,9(12):2342. ZHAO X G,ZHANG Y Z,LIANGJ,et al.The sustainable development of the economic-energy-environment (3E) system under the carbon trading (CT) mechanism:A Chinese case.Sustainability,2018,10(1):98. JIANG H Q,SHAO X X,ZHANG X,et al.A study of the allocation of carbon emission permits among the provinces of China based on fairness and efficiency.Sustainability,2017,9(11):2122. 潘家华.满足基本需求的碳预算及其国际公平与可持续含义.世界经济与政治,2008(1):35-42. QI S Z,CHENG S.China’s national emissions trading scheme:integrating cap,coverage and allocation.Climate Policy,2018,18(s1): 45-59. LIU L W,CHEN C X,ZHAO Y F,et al.China’s carbon-emissions trading:Overview,challenges and future.Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews,2015,49:254-266. WU B,HUANG W Y, LIU P F.Carbon reduction strategies based on an NW small-world network with a progressive carbon tax.Sustainability,2017,9(10):1747. CHEN W,ZHOU J F,LI S Y,et al.Effects of an energy tax (carbon tax) on energy saving and emission reduction in guangdong province-based on a CGE model.Sustainability,2017,9(5):681. FUKUI H,MIYOSHI C.The impact of aviation fuel tax on fuel consumption and carbon emissions:The case of the US airline industry.Transportation Research Part D:Transport and Environment,2017,50:234-253. ZIMMER A,KOCH N.Fuel consumption dynamics in Europe:Tax reform implications for air pollution and carbon emissions.Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice,2017,106:22-50. WEI J,HUANG K,YANG S S,et al.Driving forces analysis of energy-related carbon dioxide(CO2) emissions in Beijing:an input-output structural decomposition analysis.Journal of Cleaner Production,2017,163:58-68. LENZEN M.Structural analyses of energy use and carbon emissions-an overview.Economic Systems Research,2016,28(2):119-132. NIE H G,KEMP R,VIVANCO D F,et al.Structural decomposition analysis of energy-related CO2 emissions in China from 1997 to 2010.Energy Efficiency,2016,9(6):1351-1367. AKTAN A E Ö. Carbon reduction with solar energy in cities//Energy production and management in the 21st Century, 2014, 190:959-970. AKPAN U S,GREEN O A,BHATTACHARYYA S,et al.Effect of technology change on CO2 emissions in Japan’s industrial sectors in the period 1995–2005:An Input–Output structural decomposition analysis.Environmental and Resource Economics,2015,61(2):165-189. IZUMI Y.Recent advances in the photocatalytic conversion of carbon dioxide to fuels with water and/or hydrogen using solar energy and beyond.Coordination Chemistry Reviews,2013,257(1):171-186. FU J X,TANG G H,ZHAO R J,et al.Carbon reduction programs and key technologies in global steel industry.Journal of Iron and Steel Research International,2014,21(3):275-281. AN T H,JIA K.Rubber-tyred gantry crane (RTG) dual power energy saving system.United States Patent Application 20160159619,2016. MOLINA C,EARN D J D.Evolutionary stability in continuous nonlinear public goods games.Journal of Mathematical Biology,2017,74(1/2):499-529. 刘枚莲,李宗活,张婕.基于前景理论的政企低碳策略演化博弈分析.科技管理研究,2017,37(20):245-253. 吴士健,孙向彦,杨萍.双重治理体制下政府碳排放监管博弈分析.中国人口·资源与环境,2017,27(12):21-30. 焦建玲,陈洁,李兰兰,等.碳减排奖惩机制下地方政府和企业行为演化博弈分析.中国管理科学,2017,25(10):140-150. 汪振双,刘景矿,邓斌超,等.基于政府、企业和业主三方动态博弈的建筑物化阶段碳减排责任分析.工程管理学报,2017,31(1):34-38. 孙夙鹏,孙晓阳.低碳经济下环境 NGO参与企业碳减排的演化博弈分析.运筹与管理,2016,25(2):113-119.
    Cited by
    Comments
    Comments
    分享到微博
    Submit
Get Citation

张凯泽,沈菊琴,徐沙沙,孙付华.碳排放监管中政府与企业演化博弈及策略研究:基于第三方监督视角[J].重庆大学学报社会科学版,2020,26(4):82~92

Copy
Share
Article Metrics
  • Abstract:742
  • PDF: 5121
  • HTML: 940
  • Cited by: 0
History
  • Received:March 19,2019
  • Online: August 17,2020
Article QR Code