2025年7月26日 周六
Trust and incentives: The geographical relationship and high-quality information disclosure of listed company executives
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F273.1;C912.1;F832.51;F224

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    Abstract:

    This paper analyzes the impact of geographic relationship to the information disclosure quality by employing the example of Shenzhen Stock Exchange listed company and the information disclosure results between 2005-2017. In sample time, the geographic relationship between the chairman and the general manager is universal, and the provincial geographic relationship accounts for an average of 55.51% annually, and it is increasing year by year. It is shown in Order Logit regression that geographic relationship has significant boost on the quality level of company information disclosure. In addition, the Logit regression shows the geographic relationship is more conducive to achieving the highest quality information disclosure. The further analysis indicatesthat the closer the geographic relationship, the more significant the impact on information disclosure; after controlling the alumni, relatives and endogeneity, the conclusion still holds. Full trust based on hometown conditions is the foundation of the geo-relationship effect. The farther the company is from their hometown, the stronger the homesickness and the stronger the geo-relationship effect; the combination of geo-relationship and equity incentives will significantly improve the quality of information disclosure and can positively regulate equity incentives effect. The high quality of information disclosure of state-owned enterprises has nothing to do with geographic relations. State-owned enterprises should find other ways to improve the quality of information disclosure, such as post-event accountability and strengthening the internal governance of state-owned enterprises.

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孔庆洋,张成,闵继胜.信任与激励:上市公司高管的地缘关系与高质量信息披露[J].重庆大学学报社会科学版,2021,27(2):67~81

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History
  • Revised:September 26,2020
  • Online: March 13,2021
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