2025年6月14日 周六
From code to law:Construction of digital competition rules for blockchain platforms
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D923;TP311.13

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    Abstract:

    Since the concept of Bitcoin was proposed in 2008, the scale and speed of impact of blockchain on social governance structure and industrial architecture have been unprecedented, especially in the field of value storage such as finance. The changes brought by blockchain are revolutionary. The prosperity of blockchain requires effective legal supervision. The distributed architecture, consensus mechanism, anonymity, and immutability of blockchain are not only key elements in the development of blockchain, but also a breeding ground for implementing anti-competitive behavior. The problem of consensus is solved by cryptography, but the industrialization of mining also easily leads to the concentration of computing power. Collusion among operators promoted by token incentives and opaque effects formed inside and outside blockchain, mutual supervision and enforcement platforms provided for collusion, discriminatory behavior and exploitative pricing, and other anti-competitive behaviors, the fundamental position of blockchain platforms and standardization provide conditions for the abuse of market dominance, which must be effectively regulated. The decentralization of blockchain platforms naturally excludes regulation, bringing about difficulties in defining market entities. Its decentralized management mechanism makes it difficult to effectively allocate responsibilities, and the immutability of blockchain makes traditional remedies ineffective. Therefore, it is necessary to apply behavioral conditions such as modifying platform rules and algorithms to create forks at various nodes online and determine non-traditional measures such as terminating relevant transactions on the platform. The traditional pyramid shaped hierarchical anti-competitive regulatory model shows a mismatch and unsuitability when facing blockchain. Blockchain technology and anti-monopoly should be interconnected in terms of value, adhering to a cooperative relationship rather than mutual exclusion, and jointly adhering to basic value principles such as maintaining security, competition, and reliability. The principle of inclusive and prudent supervision should be implemented on blockchain platforms to address the traditional regulatory paradox of management leads to death, release leads to chaos. In other words, on blockchain platforms, at present, various influencing factors can be comprehensively considered in accordance with Article 27 of the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China and Chapter 3 of the Interim Provisions on the Examination of Concentration of Business Operators. From the perspective of technical control ability, economic value intervention ability, and normative influence ability, anti-competitive behaviors can be identified, subject locked, and responsibility allocated. The transformation from code as law to law as code can be completed from a conceptual perspective, with emphasis on smart supervision and the use of safe harbors and regulatory sandboxes in tools. Measures and mechanisms for proactive prevention and effective and flexible remedies after the event can be constructed, and cooperation and collaborative supervision should be emphasized to comprehensively reform supervision. From code to law, the legal governance model in the algorithm era should adhere to a technology driven proactive and functional regulatory strategy, taking into account the interests and needs of different entities, achieving dual governance of law and technology, and accelerating the development of China’s new quality productivity.

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黄运康.从代码到法律:区块链平台数字竞争规则的建构[J].重庆大学学报社会科学版,2024,30(5):222~234

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  • Online: November 12,2024
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