Abstract:Presently, a peak of intergenerational succession has already begun in Chinese family businesses. Internationalization is a key strategy for family firms to achieve long-term competitiveness and sustainable growth. Previous literatures on the impact of intergenerational succession on family firm internationalization largely examine the effects of family next generation involvement in power on the internationalization of family firm, and ignore the influence of second generation succession patterns on the internationalization of family firms. On the basis of dividing second generation succession patterns into the evolutionary succession pattern and revolutionary succession pattern in Chinese family businesses, the authors make the initial effort to empirically examine the effect of second generation succession patterns on family firm internationalization, and explore the moderating effects of intergenerational authority, founder political identity and successor age in the above relationship. Furthermore, they explore the masking effect of internationalization commitment in the above relationship, so as to reveal the mechanism and context of second generation succession patterns on family firm internationalization. Drawing on the survey data of 253 family firms in the eastern and western provinces or municipalities (e.g., Chongqing, Zhejiang,) from 8 to 10 month in 2020, they find that:first, compared to the revolutionary succession pattern, family firms that adopt the evolutionary succession pattern are more likely to choose deep, extensive and rapid access to international market; second, intergenerational authority, founder political identity and successor age significantly weakens the positive effects of the evolutionary succession pattern on internationalization depth, breadth and speed in family firms, that is, the positive effects of the evolutionary succession pattern on internationalization depth, breadth and speed become less obvious in family firms with higher intergenerational authority, founder political identity and older successors. The authors employ an alternative definition for family business, as well as select samples of family firms that are going or had already gone through intergenerational succession for robustness test, the above-mentioned results are still valid. Expand research shows that internationalization commitment plays a masking effect on the relationship between the evolutionary succession pattern and both internationalization depth and breadth, that is, the evolutionary succession pattern weakens its positive effects on both internationalization depth and breadth by reducing the level of international commitment in family firms. Based on the above research results, the following recommendations are put forward. Firstly, founders in family firms should make succession plans in advance, and arrange the evolutionary succession for the second generation as far as possible. In the process of evolutionary succession, founders should help the second successors to establish authority legitimacy as soon as possible to reduce the authority difference between the two generations. Secondly, founders in family firms should rationally understand the positive and negative effects of political relations, and actively build a friendly and clean relationship between government and business. Government departments should strive to build a more just, fair and transparent business environment, so as to fully mobilize the enthusiasm of family entrepreneurs in business activities.

Abstract:In recent years, with the rapid development of society and economy, controlling shareholders share pledge has become a very common phenomenon in China capital market. The so-called share pledge of controlling shareholders refers to a debt financing method in which controlling shareholders pledge their own shares to banks, securities companies, trust companies and other financial institutions to obtain credit funds. This financing method has more advantages than other financing methods in terms of convenience and rapidity, which can quickly help controlling shareholders solve the problem of capital shortage, but also makes enterprises face the risk of control transfer. For this reason, the share pledge behavior of controlling shareholders of listed companies has aroused widespread concern in the academic and practical circles. Although existing research has explored the influence of controlling shareholders share pledge on corporate audit fees, few scholars have gone deep into the family firms level to explore the relationship between controlling shareholders share pledge and audit fees. To this end, this article takes Chinas A-share listed family companies from 2008 to 2017 as the research object, deeply examines the impact of controlling shareholders share pledge on audit fees, and analyzes the moderating effects of CEO from different sources. On this basis, we have carried out research design, constructed relevant research models, and verified the relevant mechanisms and hypotheses proposed in the article through descriptive statistical analysis, correlation analysis, multiple regression analysis and mechanism analysis. The study finds that the share pledge of family controlling shareholders is significantly positively correlated with the audit fees charged by auditors. At the same time, compared with family CEO, non-family CEO will significantly weaken the positive correlation between the family controlling shareholders share pledge and audit fees. Further analysis finds that the controlling shareholders share pledge will lead to a significant increase in corporate governance risks and earnings manipulation risks, thereby increasing the audit fees of the family firms. Finally, after considering potential endogenous issues, re-measurement of audit fees, and narrowing the sample range of family firms, our research conclusions remain unchanged. The above research conclusions show that the risk arising from the share pledge by the controlling shareholder of the family firms can be identified by the auditor, therefore the auditor will compensate by charging more audit fees. At the same time, the non-family CEO can restrict the family controlling shareholders benefit encroachment, which will help auditors to better identify the risks arising from the family controlling shareholders share pledge. Therefore, auditors can implement differentiated charging strategies based on the different sources of family firms CEO. This article not only extends the controlling shareholders share pledge to the family firms level for research, but also enriches and supplements the relevant literature on audit fees. So, it has certain theoretical contributions and practical significance for auditors to implement differentiated charging strategies.

Abstract:Family firms are the predominant form of business organization in China. Entrepreneurship orientation (EO) plays an important role in promoting the transformation and upgrading of family firms and their sustainable growth in China. This paper aims to explore the effect of family members psychological ownership on entrepreneurial orientation of family firms, and to examine the moderating effects of family involvement (i.e., family management, family generation) and institutional environment in this relationship using the data of family firms in Eastern and Western China. The result reveals that family members psychological ownership positively impacts entrepreneurial orientation of family firms. The result also shows that family management positively moderates the relationship between family members psychological ownership and entrepreneurial orientation of family firms. That is, as family management increases, the positive effect of family members psychological ownership on EO of family firms increase. In addition, family generation in management and institutional environment negatively moderate the relationship between family members psychological ownership and entrepreneurial orientation of family firms. That is, as family generation in management increases, or institutional environment improves, the positive effects of family members psychological ownership on EO of family firms decrease. This paper not only enriches the existing researches on antecedents of family firm entrepreneurial orientation in emerging economies, but also provides enlightenment for family firms entrepreneurship in China.

Abstract:This paper aims to explore the effect of technological innovation on family firm performance,and to examine the moderating role of socioemotional wealth in this relationship using the data of 251 family firms in Zhejing and Chongqing.First,we find that technological innovation has a significant inverted-U-shaped relationship with family firm performance.Second,the effect of technological innovation on family firm performance is negatively moderated by socioemotional wealth.That is,technological innovation will have a less effect on family firm performance as the preservation of socioemotional wealth increases.The paper not only riches the relative research of the technological innovation in family firms,but also gives references to the technological innovation and growth of Chinese family firm.

Abstract:Based on identifying socioemotional wealth (SEW) of Chinese family firms as family control, family members identification with the firm, conservation of social capital, and the vision of family generational succession, this paper empirically tests the impact of the preservation of SEW on network strategy of family firms, also examines the mediating effect of partner identity in this relationship using the data of manufacturing family firms in Zhejing and Chongqing. First, we find that family control negatively influences centrality, density and intensity of network, but positively influences duration of network; family identification positively influences density of network; conservation of social capital positively influences centrality and intensity of network; the vision of family generational succession positively influences centrality and density of network, but negatively influences duration of network. We also find that partner identity mediates the relationship between the preservation of SEW and centrality, density and intensity of network in Chinese family firms.

Abstract:In comparison to governance theories, such as first-consideration for shareholders governance theory, human capital governance theory, benefit holders governance theory and core benefit holders governance theory, the paper puts forward the human capital related property-right contractual governance practice, which is managed in a professional way in family firms, should be based on human capital theory and core benefit holders theory.And then the balance between financial capital and human capital is reached. What’s more, the coordinated model among professional managed property-right contract, controlling-right contract and human-right contract. Finally, by taking Alibaba as an example, the paper explores the concrete application of the coordinated model. This not only expands the contents of the family firm governance research, but also makes great innovation on the human capital related property-right contractual governance model by family firms in China.