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Volume 9, Issue 4, 2003
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On the Principal-Agent Problem and the Incentive-Monitor System of the Venture Capital
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F830.59
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曹兴,王福民.论风险投资委托代理问题与激励约束机制[J].重庆大学学报社会科学版,2003,9(4):48~51
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March 12,2003
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