Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection :Problem in the Process of the Deposit Insurance System

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Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection :Problem in the Process of the Deposit Insurance System
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Abstract:

As one of three "finance safe net",the Deposit Insurance System has always being disturbed by asymmetric information since it was established.Furthermore,the Deposit Insurance System is doubted by the authorities in many countries because of moral hazard

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刘鹤麟,朱琳,傅凤.道德风险与逆向选择:存款保险制度问题规避[J].重庆大学学报社会科学版,2005,11(5):41~43

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