Determining the winning bidder of some major or technically complex government project is not only the price, bat also the quality and duration etc． So, the paper regards the selection process of government project tenderee and bidder as a three-stage dynamic game of offer, commitment and evaluation, and to build a non-cooperative and dynamic game model based on multi-attribute government project bidding, and then to consider the price of a function of quality and duration, to find out the optimal bidding strategy of bidder． The analysis turns up that the quality and advanced time respectively after reach one point, the bidder’s earnings are a rise function of quality and advance time, and then the bidder’s earnings would be a decrease function if it before reaches the point． The bidder’s earnings would be much more if the preferences coefficient is much greater of quality and advance time by which tenderee promises, so to gain more bidding surplus, the tenderee would exaggerate the preferences coefficient of quality and advance times． At last, this paper verifies the validity of the model by using examples．