Nature of property rights,controlling shareholders and enterprise independent innovation
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F721.5

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    Abstract:

    This paper uses Poisson,negative binomial,ZIP and ZINB four regression models to explore the relationship among nature of property rights,controlling shareholders and enterprise independent innovation based on the resource based theory and dynamic capability theory,with sample of Chinese listed companies from Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange for the 2006-2015 period.The results indicate that:1) The shareholding ratios of controlling shareholders show a U-shaped dynamic relationship with the inputs of enterprise technological innovation activities,indicating both incentive effect and entrenchement effect.For the output of innovation activities,controlling shareholders mainly present an entrenchment effect,and this expropriation effect is more pronounced with an increase in their ownership ratio,further leading to a decrease in innovation efficiency.2) SOEs' and non-SOEs' controlling shareholders' shareholding both has an entrenchment effect on output of enterprise technological innovation activities.Controlling shareholders of non-SOEs have more inhibitory effect than those of SOEs.Meanwhile,a promotional effect on innovation output from ownership concentration of non-SOEs has been observed.

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宁青青,陈金勇,袁蒙菡.产权性质、控股股东与企业自主创新[J].重庆大学学报社会科学版,2018,24(4):96~107

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History
  • Received:January 22,2018
  • Revised:January 22,2018
  • Adopted:
  • Online: June 08,2018
  • Published: