The explicit monetary compensation of managers has a certain internal structure. The annual salary of managers is generally composed of base salary, merit salary and exceeded compensation excluding equity compensation which have different functions. The base salary is a risk-free salary, which don't connect with the manager's labor results and provides a safe function; merit salary is linked to performance and belongs to risk salary; the manager's self-interest instinct and the principal's limited supervisory ability form exceeded compensation which need to be restricted. Perks refers to the consumption of managers at work. This article decides to distinguish the internal structure of manager compensation and study its relationship with implicit salary-perks. In order to ensure the reliability of the research conclusions, this paper adopts two sets of data for full sample and small sample for testing. The full sample data uses the idea of breakpoint regression. Assuming that only slightly profitable and loss-making company managers have the same ability, slightly profitable company managers receive performance bonuses, and slightly loss-making company managers only receive base salary. This article selects samples with ROA losses and profits below 2% to match them according to industry, year, and asset size. The salary of executive compensation in the slightly loss sample is lower than in the matching profit sample, then the loss sample's salary as a proxy variable for the base salary. At the same time, the performance sensitivity index between executive compensation and corporate performance is used as a proxy variable for merit salary. The regressing residual of the total compensation of the top three executives with the company characteristics is used as a proxy variable of the exceeded compensation. In addition, according to the disclosure "Senior Management Salary Management Rules", base salary, merit/base salary ratio, and exceeded compensation were manually collected to form a small sample of 150. Through the regression analysis of the two sets of data, it is found that the higher perks accompanied with the lower base salary and merit salary of the manager, and the higher exceeded compensation. If perks and monetary compensation conduct the safety and incentive function, they can be partially substitution. If they are all agency cost, there is a complementary relationship, and it's great in the state-owned enterprises. There are both substitution and complement between perks and monetary compensation which based on the internal composition of monetary compensation. The conclusions of this paper indicate that changing the salary model alone cannot reduce manager's encroachment. The innovation of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the structure of monetary compensation and perks.