工程质量风险的经济学解释与风险防范
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F224 F713.3

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An Economic Explanation of the Engineering Quality Risk and Risk Prevention
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    摘要:

    工程项目各参与方在不同阶段均面临不同的质量风险,并各自采取不同的质量风险管理决策。首先从新古典经济学角度,基于利益分歧对业主和承包商在工程质量风险管理方面决策进行经济学解释。建设项目业主与承包商之间、政府与项目法人之间的经济关系集中反映在信息的不对称性与契约的不完备性,从信息经济学角度分析建设项目委托代理关系的规律和基本特征,基于委托—代理关系对质量风险管理决策进行经济学解释。从经济学的角度提出了防范工程质量风险的措施。

    Abstract:

    Each party in engineering project faces different quality risk in different stage,and each adopts different management decision against quality risk.Firstly,from the new classic economics angle,an economic explanation to the management decision against engineering quality risk according to the different benefits for contractor and owner.The owner and contractor of a construction project,the government and projection legal person find their economic ties in an asymmetric information supply,or in an imperfectly assigned contract.The rules and characteristics of entrust-agency relation are analyzed from the economics and information economics angle,an economic explanation of engineering quality risk is given according to entrust-agency relation.The measures of controlling quality risk have been put forward from the angle of the economics.

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何寿奎 傅鸿源.工程质量风险的经济学解释与风险防范[J].土木与环境工程学报(中英文),2006,28(6):106-110. HE Shou - kui, FU Hong - yuan,. An Economic Explanation of the Engineering Quality Risk and Risk Prevention[J]. JOURNAL OF CIVIL AND ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING,2006,28(6):106-110.10.11835/j. issn.1674-4764.2006.06.028

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  • 收稿日期:2006-05-12
  • 最后修改日期:2006-05-12
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