Analysis of the Moral Risk Model during Construction Process under Asymmetric Information
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TU723.1

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    Abstract:

    During construction process,there is a "principal-agent" relation between clients and constraints.Between the two parties,there exists moral risk under asymmetric information.This paper builds a "moral risk model" between clients and constraints during the construction process by applying "principal-agent theory" in the information economics theory.On the basis of quantitative analysis of the model,this paper draws some conclusions,which is benefitial to the enhancement of the level of project management.At last,this paper proposes some advice on reducing the moral hazard of the constraints.

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朱冰 李启明.信息不对称下工程建设期道德风险模型分析[J].土木与环境工程学报(中英文),2005,27(4):102~105110

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  • Received:March 22,2005
  • Revised:March 22,2005
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