Analysis of Incentive and Supervisory Control for Project Supervision under Asymmetric Information
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F270.7

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    Abstract:

    Under the asymmetric information,the owner undertakes moral risk,which is caused by supervisor in the case of project supervision.This paper analyzes the benefit conflict while entrusting because of asymmetric information,discusses how to bring incentive and supervisory control mechanism into project supervision entrust-contract by mathematics model.Then,the design and improvement of the supervision reward in contract are discussed.

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项勇,任宏.信息不对称下工程监理激励与监控分析[J].土木与环境工程学报(中英文),2005,27(6):113~116

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  • Received:
  • Revised:June 30,2005
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