An Analysis of ESO and Manager Behavior by Game Theory
CSTR:
Clc Number:

F279.21 F272.91

  • Article
  • | |
  • Metrics
  • |
  • Reference
  • |
  • Related
  • |
  • Cited by
  • | |
  • Comments
    Abstract:

    After reform of state -owned firms mechanism, many companies appeal for ESO, but there have not been any clear theories for operation in practice until now. On the basis of principal-agent theory of the firm, this paper regards owners and managers as the two sides to game and builds the game model which analyses the behaviors of owners and managers. As a long-term stock based incentive system, ESO will align the goal of owners and managers and make them reach Nash Equilibrium to maximize their utility, and lower agency cost to solve the agency problem in modern firms.

    Reference
    Related
    Cited by
Get Citation

李洪 刘星 等.经理股票期权与经理人员努力的博弈分析[J].重庆大学学报,2002,25(3):138~141

Copy
Share
Article Metrics
  • Abstract:
  • PDF:
  • HTML:
  • Cited by:
History
  • Revised:November 29,2001
Article QR Code