Revelation Game of the Private Information Under Asymmetric Information
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Clc Number:

F830.9

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    Abstract:

    Because of the existence of the private information, the informed trader can make excess payoffs by using the information advantages. And also the informed trader can choose the trade strategies to attain the up most excess payoffs. However, he may lose his information advantages. This paper analyzes the conditions when the informed trader can make use of the private information and its optimal times underlying the framework of the strategic market game.

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郑海磊,蒲勇健.非对称信息下私人信息的揭示博弈分析[J].重庆大学学报,2004,27(12):149~151

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  • Revised:July 15,2004
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