Analysis of the Game Model of Supervision on Swindle in the Securities Market
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F830.59

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    Abstract:

    Swindle exists commonly in any securities markets, where swindle has led to serious influences on regulations and the normal development of our securities market. The paper attempts to develop a game model of supervision on swindle in the securities market so as to investigate the relationship between supervisor and supervisee from the microcosmic aspect, and analyze the microcosmic mechanism resulting to swindle in the securities market, and enlighten our securities supervision as to swindle in the securities market.

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杨柏.对证券市场欺诈行为监管的博弈分析[J].重庆大学学报,2006,29(5):142~145

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  • Received:December 20,2005
  • Revised:December 20,2005
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