货币政策权力的宪法性配置研究
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Research on Constitutional Allocation of Monetary Policy Power
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    摘要:

    不可兑现的纸币的信用基础是发行人透过货币契约对货币购买力所作的承诺,这一承诺是设定货币政策权力的目的性依据和约束性前提。从维护持币人权利的角度考量,货币政策与其他宏观经济政策存在冲突的可能,货币政策权力有被金融机构俘获的风险,需要将货币政策权力置于宪法性约束机制之中,以保证货币政策的相对独立性。实现货币政策独立,需要在宪法性层面有效配置货币政策权力,其主要方略是:保障持币人对货币决策的参与和监督权,控制货币当局的货币政策制定权,约束行政当局的宏观调控权,反制金融机构的货币软权力。

    Abstract:

    Although Fiat money does not have any substantial intrinsic value,its credit is based on the issuer’s promise of its purchasing power through money contract. This promise is the ground and precondition to establish the goal and binding force of the monetary policy power. Monetary policy could potentially conflict with other macroeconomic policy,and the monetary policy power has the risk of being captured by other financial institutions. In order to protect the rights of moneyholders,it is necessary to put the monetary policy power under the mechanism of constitutional supervision so as to keep the monetary policy relatively independent. Achieving this object needs effective allocation of monetary policy power on the constitutional level. The main measures are: to safeguard moneyholder’s right to be involved in the decisionmaking and auditing about money,to control the power of money administrations to make monetary policy,to confine the macroregulation powers of administrative agencies,to constrain the soft money powers of financial institutions.

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单飞跃,鲁勇睿.货币政策权力的宪法性配置研究[J].重庆大学学报社会科学版,2011,17(3):109-115.

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