基于损失厌恶的团队知识共享激励机制研究
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国家自然科学基金项目(70872121)


The Incentive Mechanism for Knowledge Sharing within Teams Based on Loss Aversion
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    摘要:

    考虑代理人具有损失厌恶非理性心理特征,引入分段线性形式损失厌恶效用函数,建立了基于损失厌恶的团队知识共享激励模型,与不考虑损失厌恶的三种情形进行比较,分析了不同的激励效果;采用仿真方法分析基于损失厌恶的激励机制中目标业绩、损失厌恶系数和知识共享重要性系数对双方最优决策和委托人期望效用的影响。研究结果显示:损失厌恶和委托人惩罚力度是负向激励方式,需同向变化,否则将减弱损失厌恶非理性心理特征的激励作用;损失厌恶激励机制中目标业绩有阈值要求,应设置在相对较低水平;当给定目标业绩时,代理人损失厌恶程度有上限要求,损失厌恶的惩罚激励机制具有优越性和合理性。

    Abstract:

    By considering the agent’s loss aversion irrational psychological characteristic and introducing the piece-wise linear gain-loss function, the incentive mechanism for knowledge sharing within teams based on loss aversion is proposed. It is compared with three cases that lack loss aversion to analyze the incentive effects. The simulation method is adopted to analyze the effects of target performance and loss aversion coefficient and knowledge sharing importance coefficient on the two parties’ optimal decisions and the principal’s expected utility. The results show that loss aversion and the principal’s punishment are negative stimulations, so they must change coincidentally, otherwise it may weaken loss aversion’s incentive function, and the target performance has a threshold requirement and should be maintained at a relatively low level, when target performance is given the degree of loss aversion which has a upper limit, and the punish incentive mechanism based on loss aversion has the advantages and rationality.

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胡新平,廖清.基于损失厌恶的团队知识共享激励机制研究[J].重庆大学学报社会科学版,2012,18(4):50-57.

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