This paper analyzes how the international climate fund should raise and allocate funds to achieve global climate governance Pareto optimality and its own fiscal balance. For this purpose, this paper firstly acquires Pareto optimality condition through solving the Pareto optimal model of global climate governance. Secondly, this paper acquires market equilibrium condition through solving market equilibrium model. Then, comparing Pareto optimality condition and market equilibrium condition, this paper infers the necessary and sufficient price conditions that make market equilibrium result realizing the Pareto optimality. Based on this, considering fiscal balance, this paper deduces the only rules to be followed for fund raising and allocation of international climate fund taking global Pareto optimal and fiscal balance into consideration. Then, this paper presents a complete capital raising and allocation program of international climate fund considering global Pareto optimal and fiscal balance, and the corresponding policy recommendations to promote international climate fund. Main innovations of this paper are: 1)it modifies the hypothesis of the public externality model constructed by Baumol & Oates that makes the conclusion of this paper more suitable for global climate governance analysis; 2)it deduces the only price conditions for the global Pareto optimal and fiscal balance of international climate fund.