How the changes in the internal organizational structure of enterprises affect the earnings quality of enterprises has not been fully studied. The CEO of a private enterprise at the beginning of its business is the founder of the company. However, as the company grows and develops, the founder's personal ability and experience are increasingly unable to meet the development needs of the company. The founder will abandon the CEO of the concurrent enterprise and turn to the external professional manager, resulting in the first type of agency problem: The founders, as well as external supervisors and investors, increasingly expect companies to provide higher quality information. Based on the discussion of the impact of non-founder CEO management on the earnings information quality of enterprises, the sample of 336 private enterprises listed on the GEM from 2009-2016 is taken as a sample. The earnings information is measured by earnings persistence, earnings response coefficient and earnings management. The two-stage least squares method is used to explore the impact of the founder's abandonment of the concurrent CEO on the earnings information quality. And the results show that the non-founder CEO can inhibit the company's earnings management. Further research finds that when the external regulatory pressure companies face is higher, the positive influence of non-founder CEOs on the earnings information quality is weakened. Finally, corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are proposed.