人工智能刑法主体地位的积极论——兼与消极论的答谈
作者:
作者单位:

作者简介:

通讯作者:

中图分类号:

D914;TP18

基金项目:

国家社会科学基金重大项目"健全社会公平正义法治保障制度研究"(20ZDA032);国家社会科学基金青年项目"人工智能时代的刑法前瞻与应对研究"(18CFX041)


Positivism for AI subject in criminal law: Also answer to the negativism
Author:
Affiliation:

Fund Project:

  • 摘要
  • |
  • 图/表
  • |
  • 访问统计
  • |
  • 参考文献
  • |
  • 相似文献
  • |
  • 引证文献
  • |
  • 资源附件
  • |
  • 文章评论
    摘要:

    智能技术及其应用的迅猛发展,对以人类的主体性地位为根本存立前提的当代法律体系形成强烈冲击,智能主体的刑法地位成为关键问题。目前,消极论和积极论处于相持阶段,加速了现行刑法理论体系的知识变革进程。"人造物"等不同程度的消极论,以现行刑事法律制度难以直接接纳及其所裹挟的潜在的刑事风险等为由,虽有其可取之处,但其逻辑机理正是过度释放人类中心主义的预设效应。完全按照人类中心的立场进行审视会得出无法调和的结论,也显示了智能技术应用的工具属性被深度放大之倾向,但上述消极事由不尽然合乎规制人工智能犯罪的现实需要,也与法律主体制度的演进规律不符,甚至会压制刑法主体的自主进化。"电子人"等不同形式的积极论,率先走出绝对的人类中心主义及其观念束缚,以发展的眼光看待人工智能与刑法的互动及其动向,更加契合了人工智能犯罪的发展动态。而意志自由、刑事责任能力、道德伦理规则、智能程度与智能主体类型、刑事责任的客观存在、算法的特殊地位与意义等既有的知识框架与新的要素累积,意味着人工智能可以在发展的刑法体系中实现衔接与契合。经由不真正完全背离刑法原理的认识扭转,亦供给了学理层面的支撑。而且,遵循功利主义的理路,以及在一系列有关人工智能主体方面的先行立法之做法的引领下,应分阶段、类型化、动态化厘定智能主体的刑法地位,使其在法律拟制的路径上可以继续延续和拓展。在人工智能的刑法主体地位得以澄清下,有必要接受智能主体可以享有一定的新兴权利之现实情状,但应具体地确证权利类型等具体内容。在现阶段的技术代际之策动下,智能主体的权利内容与范围目前是限制性的,无法采取与"人"对等的保护策略,保护方式也应有别。这种"降维"保护有其现实合理性,通过积极制度设计与规则配置,能够最大限度策应人工智能主体的刑法地位之更迭态势。

    Abstract:

    The rapid development of intelligent technology and its application has a strong impact on the contemporary legal system based on the fundamental premise of human subjectivity, and the criminal law status of artificial intelligent subjects has become a key issue. At present, the negative theory and the positive theory are in a stalemate, accelerating the process of knowledge change in the current criminal law theoretical system. Different degrees of negativism, such as "artificial objects", have their merits on the grounds that the current criminal legal system is difficult to directly accept them and they carry potential criminal risks. Its logical mechanism is the presupposition effect of excessive release of anthropocentrism. Examining from an anthropocentric standpoint will lead to irreconcilable conclusions, and it also shows the tendency of the tool attributes of intelligent technology applications to be deeply magnified. However, the above-mentioned negative reasons are not necessarily in line with the actual needs of regulating artificial intelligence crimes, they are also inconsistent with the evolution law of legal subject system, and it will even suppress the autonomous evolution of the subject of criminal law. Different forms of positive theory such as "cyborg" are the first to break out of absolute anthropocentrism and its conceptual constraints, and view the interaction and trends of artificial intelligence and criminal law from a developmental perspective, which is more in line with the development trend of artificial intelligence crimes. The accumulation of existing knowledge frameworks and new elements, such as freedom of will, criminal responsibility, moral and ethical rules, intelligence level and types of intelligent subjects, the objective existence of criminal responsibility, and the special status and significance of algorithms, means that artificial intelligence can develop in the future to achieve cohesion and fit in the criminal law system. This reversal of understanding, which does not really completely deviate from the principles of criminal law, also provides support at the theoretical level. Moreover, following the rationale of utilitarianism, and under the guidance of a series of advanced legislation on artificial intelligence subjects, the criminal status of intelligent subjects should be determined in stages, types, and dynamics, so that they can continue and expand on the path of legal fiction. Under the clarification of the subject status of artificial intelligence in criminal law, it is necessary to accept the reality that intelligent subjects can enjoy certain emerging rights, but the specific content such as the type of rights should be specifically confirmed. Under the instigation of the current technology generation, the content and scope of the rights of intelligent subjects are currently limited, and it is impossible to adopt a protection strategy equivalent to that of "people", and the protection methods should also be different. This kind of "dimension reduction" protection has its practical rationality. Through active system design and rule configuration, it can coordinate with the changing situation of the criminal law status of artificial intelligence subjects to the greatest extend.

    参考文献
    相似文献
    引证文献
引用本文

孙道萃.人工智能刑法主体地位的积极论——兼与消极论的答谈[J].重庆大学学报社会科学版,2022,28(4):216-229. DOI:10.11835/j. issn.1008-5831. fx.2021.04.001

复制
分享
文章指标
  • 点击次数:
  • 下载次数:
  • HTML阅读次数:
  • 引用次数:
历史
  • 收稿日期:
  • 最后修改日期:
  • 录用日期:
  • 在线发布日期: 2022-09-30
  • 出版日期: