标准必要专利FRAND承诺之法律性质辨析
作者:
中图分类号:

D913

基金项目:

杭州师范大学科研启动费项目(4025C50222204157)


On the legal nature of standard essential patent FRAND commitment
Author:
  • 摘要
  • | |
  • 访问统计
  • |
  • 参考文献 [18]
  • |
  • 相似文献 [11]
  • | | |
  • 文章评论
    摘要:

    民法的平等原则派生义务自主原则,主体只能为自己设定义务,不能为他人设定义务。缔约行为的本质即主体在相对关系中为自己设定债务。缔结双务合同,即缔约双方分别为自己设定债务,以此作为交换条件。"我将公平、合理、无歧视地授予许可",虽然"公平、合理、无歧视"的含义并不明确,但可以明确的是,许可不是无条件的,而是有偿的。作为许可条件的费用,理应是标准必要专利的实施者为自己设定的债务,当此交换条件还不明确时,标准必要专利权人不可能作出授予许可的意思表示。标准必要专利权人向标准化组织所作的FRAND承诺不含效果意思,非法律行为,而是要约邀请、事实行为。标准必要专利权人并未因FRAND承诺而为自己设定任何债务,标准化组织或潜在实施者也未因FRAND承诺而取得任何债权。"利他合同"是由本合同与本合同债务人向第三人单方允诺而缔结之单务合同的"组合",而标准必要专利许可使用合同为双务合同、有偿合同,因此,标准必要专利权人与标准化组织之间不存在"利他合同"关系,潜在实施者不构成"第三方收益者"。根据义务自主原则,即使法律能够推定标准必要专利权人通过默示意思表示为自己设定容忍潜在实施者使用标准必要专利的义务,也无法推定标准必要专利权人通过默示意思表示为潜在实施者设定支付许可费的义务。默示许可规则只能推出无条件许可的结果,与标准必要专利权人追求对价的目的相冲突,与标准必要专利许可使用合同的双务、有偿的性质相矛盾。标准必要专利权人作出FRAND承诺后,与潜在实施者仍是不特定人之间的关系,并不存在"先合同义务"。潜在实施者也不享有任何类似狭义形成权的优势地位,不得为标准必要专利权人设定承诺义务、缔约义务,否则意味着实施者可将自己的意志强加于标准必要专利权人,违反民法的平等原则。

    Abstract:

    The principle of self-determined obligation is derived from the principle of equality of civil law. That is, one can only set obligations for himself, and no one can set obligations for others. The essence of concluding a contract is that a person sets debts for himself in the relative relationship. To conclude a bilateral contract is that both contracting parties set their own debts as a condition of exchange. Although the meaning of "Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory" is not clear, it is clear that the license is not unconditional, but paid. The license fee, as a license condition, should be the debt set by the implementer of the standard essential patent. When this exchange condition is not clear, it is impossible for the standard essential patentee to make a declaration of will of licensing. The FRAND commitment made by the standard essential patentee to the standard-setting organization does not contain effect meaning. It is not a juristic act. It is a factual act, an invitation to offer. The standard essential patentee has not set any debt for himself due to FRAND commitment, and the standard-setting organization and potential implementers have not obtained any creditor’s rights due to FRAND commitment. The third-party beneficiary contract comprises a master contract and a unilateral contract concluded by the debtor of the master contract who promises to the third party unilaterally. However, the standard essential patent licensing contract is a bilateral contract and an onerous contract. For this reason, there are no third-party beneficiary contracts between the standard essential patentee and the standard-setting organization. Potential implementers do not constitute third-party beneficiaries. According to the principle of self-determined obligation, even if the law can infer that the standard essential patentee sets for himself the obligation to tolerate the use of standard essential patent by potential implementers through his implied declaration of will, it cannot infer that the standard essential patentee sets for potential implementers the obligation to pay licensing fees through his implied declaration of will. We can only infer from the implied licensing rule that the license is unconditional, which conflicts with the patentee’s purpose of pursuing consideration, and the nature of the standard essential patent licensing contract. Even if the standard essential patentee has made the FRAND commitment, the relationships between him and potential implementers are still unspecified, and there is no pre-contract obligation. Potential implementers also do not enjoy any superior position based on the rights of formation. They cannot set obligations of commitment or contracting for the standard essential patentee. Otherwise, it means that the implementers can impose their will on the standard essential patentee, violating the principle of equality of civil law.

    参考文献
    [1] LERNER J,TIROLE J.Standard-essential patents[J].Journal of Political Economy,2015,123(3):547-586.
    [2] LAWRANCE S,HOPSON H.Morecertainty for FRAND licensing? The English high court’s judgment in Unwired Planet v. Huawei[J].The Licensing Journal,2017,37(6):3.
    [3] LAYNE-FARRAR A,PADILLA J,SCHMALENSEE R.Pricingpatents for licensing in standard setting organisations: Making sense of FRAND commitments[J].Antitrust Law Journal,2007,74(3):671.
    [4] NEVEN D, RÉGIBEAU P.UnwiredPlanet vs.Huawei:A welcome clarification of the concept of FRAND and of the role of competition law towards SEP licencing[J].Journal of European Competition Law & Practice,2017,8(7):463-467.
    [5] 迪特尔·梅迪库斯.德国债法总论[M].杜景林,卢谌,译.北京:法律出版社,2004:583.
    [6] 李锡鹤.民法原理论稿[M].北京:法律出版社,2009.
    [7] 李锡鹤.民法原理论稿[M].2版.北京:法律出版社,2012.
    [8] 李锡鹤.合同理论的两个疑问[J].东方法学,2010(2):105-114.
    [9] 李逸竹.绝对权,还是相对权:知识产权许可使用权性质澄清[J].西华大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2014(2): 83-87.
    [10] 叶若思,祝建军,陈文全.标准必要专利使用费纠纷中FRAND规则的司法适用[J].电子知识产权,2013(4):54-61.
    [11] 崔建远,于淑妍.合同法[M].修订本.北京:法律出版社,2000:12.
    [12] 何怀文,陈如文.技术标准制定参与人违反FRAND许可承诺的法律后果[J].知识产权,2014(10):45-49,71.
    [13] 李锡鹤.民法基本理论若干问题[M].北京:人民出版社,2007:322.
    [14] 许波.第四次专利法修改中的标准必要专利问题研究[EB/OL].(2017-03-21)[2018-02-06].http://www.ciplawyer.cn/fgzl/121161.jhtml?prid=224.
    [15] 宋柳平.专利法修改草案82条:不要缴了中国企业的枪[EB/OL].(2015-11-25)[2018-02-08].http://www.chinaipmagazine.com/news-show.asp?id=18483.
    [16] 张伟君.默示许可抑或法定许可:论《专利法》修订草案有关标准必要专利披露制度的完善[J].同济大学学报(社会科学版),2016(3):103-116.
    [17] DELRAHIM M.Takeit to the limit:Respecting innovation incentives in the application of antitrust Law[R/OL].(2017-11-10)[2018-02-08].https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1010746/download.
    [18] 曹卉.美国司法部反垄断局新任领导表示将为标准必要专利回归合理的反垄断原则[EB/OL].(2018-1-4)[2018-02-08].http://www.ctoutiao.com/432948.html.
    引证文献
引用本文

李逸竹.标准必要专利FRAND承诺之法律性质辨析[J].重庆大学学报社会科学版,2023,29(1):213-227. DOI:10.11835/j. issn.1008-5831. fx.2019.06.004

复制
分享
文章指标
  • 点击次数:
  • 下载次数:
  • HTML阅读次数:
  • 引用次数:
历史
  • 在线发布日期: 2023-02-28
文章二维码