长三角环境治理动力机制研究——环境分权抑或环保立法
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中图分类号:

F062.2;X196;D922.68;X321

基金项目:

国家社会科学基金重点项目"人与自然和谐共生目标下减污降碳协同增效长效机制与路径研究"(23AJL014);安徽省自然科学基金面上项目"长三角环境治理长效机制研究"(2208085MG190);2022年高校学科(专业)拔尖人才学术资助项目(gxbjZD2022018);安徽省教育厅自然科学基金重大项目"‘双碳’目标下长江经济带跨区域环境协同治理机制、绩效与优化研究"(2022AH040088)


Study on the dynamic mechanism of environmental governance in the Yangtze River Delta Region: Environmental decentralization or environmental protection legislation?
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    摘要:

    生态环境治理是高质量发展的核心目标之一,为治理污染,我国政府制定诸多环境政策,并将生态文明建设纳入国家发展总体布局,这表明我国政府高度重视环境治理,也显示出我国环境治理的严峻性。环境是典型的公共物品,具有较强的负外部性,其赋予环境的消费非竞争性和收益非排他性,政府作为理性的"经济人",具有追求自身利益最大化的偏好,以上特征使得政府在治理环境过程时权责不清、环境治理缺乏动力的现象频繁发生,增加环境治理的困难。环境分权、环保立法是环境治理的重要手段,能否在激励机制与问责机制方面激发地方政府环境治理动力,降低环境污染水平?文章探究环境分权和环保立法对环境治理的影响,并分析环境分权与环保立法对环境治理的动力机制,在此基础上,以长三角27个中心城市为样本,选取2003—2019年市级面板数据,采用双重差分法实证检验环境分权与环保立法对环境治理的影响,同时通过倾向得分匹配法、动态效应检验、安慰剂检验等验证文章研究结果,并提出相关政策建议。研究结果表明:环境分权激励政府进行环境治理,有效降低长三角环境污染水平,并对环境污染滞后三期发现环境分权对环境污染具有明显的滞后作用,其影响具有长效性;相较于环境分权而言,环保立法对长三角城市群环境污染的作用较为微弱,并通过动态效应检验、增加控制变量和安慰剂检验等角度进行检验,使结果更为可靠;值得注意的是,环境分权与环保立法政策组合的环境污染治理动力更为显著,两种政策组合对环境污染的抑制作用高于两者单独的政策影响。因此,文章从建立区域环境协调治理联动、强化法治建设、激励各主体环境治理等方面提出相应的环境治理政策建议,持续发挥环境分权在长期治理污染的作用,完善区域环保立法标准体系,强化环境分权与环保立法的合作治理互动效应,增强环境治理动力。文章从市级层面视角分析环境分权与环保立法对环境治理的动力机制,并通过实证进行一系列检验,丰富市级层面环境治理研究,并通过多角度稳健性检验验证环境分权与环保立法对环境治理的影响,为地方政府治理环境提供有益借鉴。

    Abstract:

    Ecological environment governance is one of the core goals of high-quality development. In order to control pollution, the Chinese government has formulated many environmental policies, and incorporated the construction of ecological civilization into the overall layout of national development, which shows that the Chinese government attaches great importance to environmental governance, and also shows the severity of China's environmental governance. The environment is a typical public good, with a strong negative externality, the consumption of the environment is non-competitive and non-exclusive. As a rational "economic person", the government has the preference to pursue the maximization of its own interests. The characteristics make the government's rights and responsibilities are not clear in the process of governance of the environment, the lack of environmental governance power and other issues are not uncommon, to a certain extent, aggravating the difficulty of environmental governance. As an important means of environmental governance, can environmental decentralization and environmental protection legislation stimulate the motivation of local government environmental governance and reduce the level of environmental pollution from the perspective of incentive mechanism and accountability mechanism? This paper explores the impact of environmental decentralization and environmental protection legislation on environmental governance, and analyzes the dynamic mechanism of environmental decentralization and environmental protection legislation on environmental governance, on this basis, taking 27 central cities in the Yangtze River Delta as a sample, selecting municipal panel data from 2003 to 2019, using the dual difference method to empirically test the impact of environmental decentralization and environmental protection legislation on environmental governance, and verifying the research results of this paper through the tendency score matching method, dynamic effect test, placebo test, etc., and puts forward relevant policy suggestions. Environmental decentralization encourages the government to carry out environmental governance, effectively reduces the level of environmental pollution in the Yangtze River Delta, and environmental decentralization has obvious lagging effect on environmental pollution in the third phase of environmental pollution, and its impact is long-term. Compared with environmental decentralization, environmental protection legislation has a weaker effect on environmental pollution in the Yangtze River Delta urban agglomeration, and is tested through dynamic effect testing, increased control variables and placebo testing, etc., to make the results more reliable; It is worth noting that the environmental pollution control momentum of the combination of environmental decentralization and environmental protection legislation and policies is more significant, and the inhibition effect of the two policy combinations on environmental pollution is higher than the policy impact of the two separately. Therefore, the article puts forward corresponding environmental governance policy suggestions from the aspects of establishing regional environmental coordination and governance linkage, strengthening the construction of the rule of law, and encouraging environmental governance of various entities, continuing to give play to the role of environmental decentralization in long-term commitment to pollution, improving the regional environmental protection legislation standard system, strengthening the interactive effect of cooperative governance between environmental decentralization and environmental protection legislation, and enhancing the driving force of environmental governance. This paper analyzes the dynamic mechanism of environmental decentralization and environmental protection legislation on environmental governance from the perspective of the municipal level, and conducts a series of empirical tests to enrich the research on environmental governance at the municipal level, and verifies the impact of environmental decentralization and environmental protection legislation on environmental governance through multi-angle robustness test, providing useful reference for local governments to govern the environment.

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李强,唐诗慧.长三角环境治理动力机制研究——环境分权抑或环保立法[J].重庆大学学报社会科学版,2023,29(5):1-17. DOI:10.11835/j. issn.1008-5831. jg.2023.02.005

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