从数据垄断走向数据开放:数据成为必需设施的竞争法分析
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中图分类号:

D922.294

基金项目:

国家社会科学基金重大项目"互联网经济的法治保障研究"(18ZDA149)


From datamonopoly to data access:Competitiveanalysis of data essential facility
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    摘要:

    数字经济下,数据发挥着越来越重要的作用,而拥有大量数据的支配企业却往往拒绝其他经营者对数据的访问,意图垄断数据资源。竞争法有必要通过必需设施规则,对支配企业拒绝访问的行为予以规制,实现数据开放,促进数据资源的流通、利用。结合必需设施规则的发展历程,必需设施规则在数字经济背景下的适用需要有严格的条件限制。这些条件包括:在经营者具有市场支配地位的前提条件下,首先数据需要构成必需设施,即数据是经营者参与市场竞争所必不可少的;其次,支配企业拒绝数据访问的行为所产生的消极效果明显大于积极效果;最后,支配企业拒绝数据访问不存在合理的理由。满足了上述条件后,支配企业才需要承担允许数据访问的义务。在此基础上,竞争法需要针对数据访问的具体要求以及其可能与个人数据保护法、知识产权法之间的关系进行细化,以使数据访问在实践中更具有操作性。具体而言,竞争法对数据访问的要求主要有三点:其一,其他经营者对数据的访问应当是公平的;其二,其他经营者对数据的访问应当是现实可行的;其三,其他经营者对数据进行访问需要支付合理的费用。在竞争法与个人数据保护法之间的关系上,一方面,个人数据保护法在一定程度上阻碍了其他经营者对数据的访问;另一方面,个人数据保护法与竞争法在价值上存在着统一性。在竞争法与知识产权法之间的关系上,大多数情况下,支配企业拒绝其他经营者对受到知识产权保护的数据的访问的行为是合法的,但是支配企业也需注意在合理的范围内行使权利,不得滥用知识产权限制数据访问的实施。在数字经济时代,我国有必要在反垄断法规范体系中纳入必需设施规则,同时在相关的法律规范和指南中对数据访问的具体内容进行设计,加强与个人数据保护、知识产权等相关法律规范的协调,实现数据访问的本土化建构,促进市场竞争,挖掘数据的巨大价值。

    Abstract:

    In the digital economy, data plays an increasingly important role, but the dominant undertaking with large amounts of data often deny other undertakings’ access to data with the intention of monopolizing data resources. It is necessary for the competition law to regulate the refusal of data access by the dominate undertaking through essential facility doctrine, so as to realize data access and promote the circulation and utilization of data resources. Combined with the development history of essential facility doctrine, the application of essential facility doctrine in the context of the digital economy requires strict conditions. These conditions include: under the precondition that the undertaking has a dominant market position, firstly, data needs to constitute an essential facility which means that data is indispensable for undertakings to participate in market competition; secondly, the negative effect of the dominant undertaking’s refusal of data access is obviously greater than the positive effect; finally, there is no reasonable reason for the dominant undertaking’s refusal of data access. It is only after the above conditions are met that the dominant undertaking needs to be under an obligation to allow data access. On this basis, the competition law needs to refine the specific requirements for data access and its possible relationship with the personal data protection law and intellectual property law to make data access more operational in practice. Specifically, there are three main competition law requirements for data access: first, other undertakings’ access to the data should be fair; second, other undertakings’ access to the data should be realistically practicable; and third, other undertakings’ access to the data is subject to the payment of a reasonable fee. In terms of the relationship between competition law and personal data protection law, on the one hand, personal data protection law hinders to a certain extent the access to data by other undertakings; on the other hand, there is a unity of value between personal data protection law and competition law. In terms of the relationship between competition law and intellectual property law, in most cases, it is legitimate for a dominant undertaking to deny other undertakings’ access to data protected by intellectual property rights, but the dominant undertaking also needs to be careful to exercise its rights within reasonable bounds and not to abuse its intellectual property rights to restrict data access. In the era of digital economy, it is necessary for China to incorporate essential facility doctrine into the normative system of antitrust law, and at the same time, design the specific content of data access in relevant legal norms and guidelines, and strengthen the coordination with the protection of personal data, intellectual property rights and other relevant legal norms, so as to realize the localized construction of data access, promote market competition, and explore the great value of data.

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李兆阳.从数据垄断走向数据开放:数据成为必需设施的竞争法分析[J].重庆大学学报社会科学版,2023,29(6):190-204. DOI:10.11835/j. issn.1008-5831. fx.2021.05.002

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