大数据杀熟背后的平台私权力及其法律矫正
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D922.294;D922.16

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国家社会科学基金青年项目"数字经济时代反垄断法实施难点问题研究(21CFX041)"


The platform private power behind big data discriminatory pricing and its legalregulation
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    摘要:

    民事领域私权力的出现最早可以追溯到市场垄断,然而平台作为商业架构和组织模式的出现意外且快速地拓展了私权力的衍生空间。通过模仿国家提供市场、通信等基础设施或公共服务,互联网商业平台在这一过程中以自我赋权的方式掌握了一种对平台内市场的管理权。随着大数据与云计算技术的日益成熟,这一权力还因互联网商业平台的"市场—政府"属性获得了资源配置与规则制定的内涵。平台经营者不仅可以依靠大数据的实时监控与预测分析克服生产的盲目性,得到平台内市场投资的最优解;亦能利用信息科技实现对平台内市场低成本、高效率的治理。但不能忽略的是,私主体提供公共服务获得管理权的形式难以避免地令此类权力具有了显著的私属性,而互联网技术的进步同时会带给平台私权力侵犯用户权益的便利:平台经营者在或直接或隐蔽地收集大量用户数据后,借助大数据与云计算技术完成对个体用户的画像,最后利用算法模型实现对不同消费者的差异化定价,以此达成蚕食消费者剩余的目的。大数据杀熟的频繁发生,在加剧消费者隐私泄露风险的同时,剥夺了消费者剩余,降低了消费者对网络交易市场的信任,也违背了"共享"的发展理念,最终阻碍了我国数字经济的发展。从现有规制方式来看,《反垄断法》不仅无力遏制中小平台的大数据杀熟行为,也难以通过滥用市场支配地位制度对大型平台的杀熟行为形成有效威慑;而面对掌握大量数据信息且理性程度远超人类个体的平台,《消费者权益保护法》无法再平衡平台内消费者与平台经营者之间的实力差距;同时,价格歧视、价格欺诈等概念亦不能用以解释大数据杀熟行为。鉴此,需从抑制私权力的治理逻辑出发,采用白名单制度明确互联网商业平台的数据收集范围,赋权用户与平台内经营者以对抗平台私权力的行使,同时加强行业自律并引入第三方监督,在遏制平台私权力恣意行使的同时保证我国数字经济稳定、健康发展。

    Abstract:

    The emergence of private power in the civil field can be traced back to market monopoly at the earliest, but the emergence of platform as a business structure and organizational model has unexpectedly and rapidly expanded the derivative space of private power. By imitating the state to provide market, communication and other infrastructure or public services, internet business platforms in this process in a self-empowering way master a kind of management of the market within the platform. With the increasing maturity of big data and cloud computing technology, this power has also gained the connotation of resource allocation and rule-making due to the market-government attribute of the internet business platform. Platform operators can not only rely on the real-time monitoring and analysis of big data to overcome the blindness of production, but also obtain the optimal solution of market investment within the platform. It can also use information technology to achieve low-cost and efficient governance of the market within the platform. However, it cannot be ignored that the form in which private entities provide public services and obtain management rights inevitably makes such rights have significant private attributes, and the progress of internet technology will also make it convenient for platform private power to infringe users’ rights and interests: After directly or secretly collecting a large amount of user data, platform operators use big data and cloud computing technology to complete the portrait of individual users, and finally use the algorithm model to achieve differentiated pricing for different consumers, so as to achieve the purpose of eating the surplus of consumers. The frequent occurrence of big data discriminatory pricing, while increasing the risk of consumer privacy disclosure, deprives consumers of surplus, reduces consumers’ trust in the network trading market, also goes against the development concept of sharing, and ultimately hinders the development of China’s digital economy. From the perspective of existing regulatory methods, the Anti-Monopoly Law is not only unable to curb big data discriminatory pricing of small and medium-sized platforms, but also difficult to effectively deter big data discriminatory pricing of large platforms through the abuse of market dominance system. However, in the face of platforms that possess a large amount of data and are far more rational than individuals, the Consumer Rights Protection Law cannot balance the strength gap between consumers and platform operators within the platform. At the same time, concepts such as price discrimination and price fraud cannot be used to explain big data discriminatory pricing. Therefore, it is necessary to define the scope of data collection of internet commercial platforms by adopting white list system from the governance logic of restraining private power, and empower the users and operators within the platform to oppose the exercise of private power of the platform, strengthen industry self-discipline and introduce third-party supervision, so as to ensure the stable and healthy development of the digital economy of China while curbing the exercise of private power of the platform.

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何昊洋.大数据杀熟背后的平台私权力及其法律矫正[J].重庆大学学报社会科学版,2023,29(6):220-232. DOI:10.11835/j. issn.1008-5831. fx.2023.08.003

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  • 在线发布日期: 2024-01-17
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