创新要素集聚、反腐与创新效率提升
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中图分类号:

D262.6;F124.3

基金项目:

重庆市社会科学规划项目(2021NDQN34、2022YC004);重庆市留学人员回国创业创新支持计划(创新资助)重点项目(cx2022001);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(SWU2009212)


Innovation elements agglomeration, anti-corruption and innovation efficiency promotion
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    摘要:

    如何实现经济高速增长向高质量发展的动能转变是新时代中国特色社会主义经济亟待破解的重要命题。既有理论研究与实践经验表明,创新驱动是实现经济高质量发展的关键突破点,而创新要素的有效集聚则是实现创新驱动的必要条件。因此,现阶段从中央政府到地方政府均大力推进创新要素的有效集聚。从理论上看,在创新要素集聚过程中,政府扮演着十分重要的角色,而腐败作为一种阻碍资源有效配置的政府行为,可能不利于创新要素的有效集聚。文章将腐败行为引入创新要素集聚与创新效率的理论分析框架中,理论分析的结论初步表明创新要素集聚有利于创新效率提升,行政腐败则抑制了这一正向效应;当反腐力度加强时,这一抑制效应可能得到一定程度上的缓解。在理论分析的基础上,文章进一步基于2002—2016年我国省级面板数据,运用Tobit空间面板回归模型、IV-Tobit模型对上述结论进行了实证检验。实证结果表明,政府主导的创新要素集聚有效促进了创新效率的提升,而腐败行为的存在则抑制了这一正向效应。该研究结论在考虑内生性问题,并进行一系列稳健性检验后依然保持一致。同时,空间计量模型的分析结果显示创新要素集聚的空间溢出效应显著为负,即各地区之间存在“各自为政”的现象,缺乏区域协同创新。进一步研究发现,党的十八大之后反腐力度的加强有效地缓解了腐败所造成的负向效应,同时也使创新要素集聚的负向空间溢出效应得到了纠偏,表明党的十八大之后的反腐行动为“创新驱动发展战略”释放了制度红利,提供了有利于创新要素有效集聚与配置的生存土壤。以上研究发现对新发展阶段我国经济高质量发展的路径选择具有一定的参考价值。据此,文章认为腐败行为的创新抑制效应意味着加强反腐力度、简政放权能够改善创新要素集聚的制度环境。反腐虽然能够降低寻求政治关联的激励,提高创新效率,但市场机制扭曲才是腐败影响创新要素集聚的根源所在。因此,现阶段应从处理好政府与市场之间的关系入手,转变政府的职能,进一步完善市场机制,最终形成以市场配置为主、以政府引导为辅的创新要素集聚模式。

    Abstract:

    How to realize the transformation from high-speed economic growth to high-quality development is an important proposition that needs to be solved urgently in the socialist economy with Chinese characteristics in the new era. The existing theoretical research and practical experience show that innovation-driven is the key breakthrough of the structural reform of supply-side, and effective clustering of innovative elements is a necessary condition to achieve innovation-driven. Thus, from the central government to local governments are vigorously promoting the effective accumulation of innovative elements. Existing research shows that government plays a very important role in the process of government-led innovation, and corruption, as a kind of government behavior that hinders the allocation of resources, may not be conducive to the effective accumulation of innovative elements. Based on this, this paper first introduces corruption into the theoretical analysis framework of innovation factor agglomeration and innovation efficiency. The conclusion of theoretical analysis preliminarily shows that innovation factor agglomeration is conducive to improving innovation efficiency, while administrative corruption inhibits this positive effect. Meanwhile, when anti-corruption efforts are strengthened, this inhibition effect may be eased to some extent. On the basis of theoretical analysis, this paper further uses Tobit spatial panel regression model and IV Tobit model to empirically test the above conclusions based on China's provincial panel data from 2002 to 2016. The empirical results show that the government-led innovation factor agglomeration effectively promotes the improvement of innovation efficiency, while the existence of corruption inhibits this positive effect. The conclusions of this study remain consistent after considering endogenous problems and conducting a series of robustness tests. At the same time, the analysis results of the spatial econometric model show that the spatial spillover effect of innovation factor agglomeration is significantly negative, that is, there is a phenomenon of "separate governance" among regions, indicating the lack of regional collaborative innovation. Further research found that the strengthening of anti-corruption efforts after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China has effectively alleviated the negative effects caused by corruption, and also corrected the negative spatial spillover effects of the concentration of innovation elements, indicating that the anti-corruption actions after the 18th National Congress released the system dividend for the "innovation driven strategy", and provided a living soil conducive to the effective concentration and allocation of innovation elements. The above findings have certain reference value for the path choice of high-quality economic development in the new development stage of China. Therefore, this paper argues that the innovation inhibition effect of corruption means that strengthening anti-corruption efforts and streamlining administration and delegating power can improve the institutional environment of innovation factor agglomeration. Notably, although anti-corruption can reduce the incentive to seek political connection and improve innovation efficiency, the distortion of market mechanism is the root cause. Therefore, we should handle the relationship between the government and the market well, transform the functions of the government, further improve the market mechanism, and finally form a model of innovation element gathering that focuses on market allocation and is supplemented by government guidance.

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王汉杰,温涛,陈汭.创新要素集聚、反腐与创新效率提升[J].重庆大学学报社会科学版,2024,30(2):51-64. DOI:10.11835/j. issn.1008-5831. jg.2022.10.003

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