There are two main arguments for the statutory general preclusion period for the right to terminate: fixing it at one year and making it flexible. The legislator adopted the former. However, the argument for fixing it at one year lacks significant basis. Scholars who advocate fixing it at one year argue that the statutory general preclusion period for the right to terminate should be analogous to the one-year preclusion period for the right of revocation. However, there is no precedent for this in comparative law. Additionally, the one-year preclusion period for the right of revocation focuses on the imputability of the cause for revocation and disregards other influencing factors. This setting mode is not suitable for the statutory general preclusion period for the right to terminate, as termination no longer requires the cause for termination to be attributable to the debtor, but mainly relies on fundamental breach of contract and failure to perform within a specified period. The legislator adheres to the view that the preclusion period is an invariable period, and thus the one-year preclusion period for the right to terminate is absolutely fixed. However, this view is the one-sided understanding of comparative law by traditional Chinese scholars. In Germany civil law, the one-year preclusion period for the right of revocation, as a mixed preclusion period, can be suspended. Therefore, this view is inappropriate as a legislative basis. In addition, in terms of the normative purpose of the preclusion period for the right to terminate, the advocates for fixing it at one year and the legislators mainly focus on "the prompt determination and stability of contractual relationships" and the balance of interests between creditors and debtors. However, they ignore two other normative purposes: preventing debtors from suffering unreasonable losses, facing risks, losing other transaction opportunities, and preventing creditors from speculating at the expense of debtors' losses. Moreover, the advocates for fixing it at one year have only conducted pure theoretical deductions and analyzed a limited number of judicial decisions. Therefore, they cannot prove that the statutory general preclusion period for the right to terminate should be fixed at one year. On the contrary, the argument for the flexibility of the statutory general preclusion period for the right to terminate is well-founded. To achieve the normative purposes, the preclusion period for the right to terminate needs to consider the type of contract, the specific normative purpose of the contract, the perishability and seasonality of the subject matter of the contract, the susceptibility of the subject matter to market price fluctuations, the risk of the subject matter being damaged or destroyed due to force majeure and unexpected events, the difficulty of alternative transactions, the type of non-performance, the possibility of continued performance, the time for legal consultation, and other reasonable factors.The factors considered in specific cases are different. The fixed one-year period cannot adapt to the differences in the factors considered in specific cases, exposing legal loopholes that are either too long or too short. Therefore, the flexibility of the statutory general preclusion period for the right to terminate is a rational choice to adapt to the differences in factors considered in specific cases. In addition to the notice factor, the statutory general preclusion period for the right to terminate takes into account the same factors as the preclusion period for the right to terminate after notice. Therefore, it should also adopt a flexible period, as the preclusion period for the right to terminate after notice does. This is also confirmed by the result of judicial decision-making experience. Furthermore, only if the statutory general preclusion period for the right to terminate is flexible and allows such factors as force majeure, lack of capacity or death of the parties, coercion of the parties, and negotiation or mediation that occurs during the preclusion period to be applicable to the provisions on the suspension of the statute of prescription, can it comply with the consistency of the evaluation of the law. To achieve the flexibility of the statutory general preclusion period for the right to terminate, the Judicial Interpretation of the General Provisions of the Contract Part of the Civil Code of the People's Republic of China should add a flexible systematic provision for the suspension, reduction, and extension of the one-year preclusion period for the right to terminate.