数字市场反垄断适用较小限制性替代措施测试
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D922.294

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司法部国家法治与法学理论研究中青年项目"反垄断法修订完善研究"(19SFB3042)


The antitrust application of less restrictive alternatives test inthe digital market
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    摘要:

    数字市场的不断发展引发了新的商业模式和商业行为,而这些模式和行为也使数字市场竞争不断呈现动态性与效果的复杂性。所谓动态,即是市场上的经营者不断根据市场供求变化调整自身的经营行为;所谓效果的复杂性,则表现出难以判断这些经营行为与模式变化所产生的竞争损害和经济收益。因此,我国反垄断执法和司法机关在运用合理原则对这些新型商业行为进行评价时,往往难以判断其产生的竞争损害大小与违法性。然而,孕育于美国反垄断司法过程中的"较小限制性替代措施测试",尽管其在"美国运通案"之前尚未被美国最高法院所采用,却可以作为"合理原则"中精简复杂经济效益分析的关键一环,从而在数字市场反垄断案件中得以适用。美国的判例法实践为其设立了适用标准和程序,这使"较小限制性替代措施测试"的适用较为平滑,因而也获得了反垄断学界的支持。正是由于其能够精简"合理原则"下竞争损益的衡量,因此,"较小限制性替代措施测试"能够达到数字市场反垄断的双重目标,即在维护市场竞争的基础上确保商业行为的经济效益最大化。并且其与动态的、复杂的数字市场竞争高度契合,因而能够有效纠正我国现阶段对于"合理原则"适用的模糊性和随意性,提高数字市场反垄断实施的精度和效率。不过,反垄断执法和司法机关同样需要审慎适用这一测试方案,如果在构思可供比较的替代措施时出错,则会使反垄断司法和执法产生"假阳性"错误,扼杀良性的商业行为。从法律原则的角度来说,该测试体现着合理原则所蕴含的比例性品格;在法律规则层面,该测试可以通过体系解释的方式在涉及垄断协议、滥用市场支配地位和经营者集中的竞争效果分析的法律条文中阐明。在法律的具体实施上,需要使该测试与数字市场的"双边或多边特性""多元化的经济效益""创新和动态性"等特征紧密结合,在判断涉案行为效果时将该测试置于这些特征之下适用。不过,由于该测试本身的缺陷及其在附属限制原则与一般"合理原则"中具有含义差别,因而需要明晰其具体适用的层次及限度。

    Abstract:

    The continuous development of digital markets has given rise to new business models and business behaviors, these models and behaviors have made digital market competition constantly dynamic and complex in its effects. The so-called dynamic feature means that the undertakings constantly adjust their business behaviors according to the changes in market supply and demand; while the so-called complexity of the effects shows that it is difficult to conclude the competitive damages and economic gains arising from the changes in these business behaviors and models. Therefore, it is often tough for China’s antitrust authorities and courts to evaluate and confirm the size and illegality of the competitive harm generated by these new business practices when applying the rule of reason. However, the less restrictive alternatives test, which was nurtured in the antitrust judicial process in the U.S., though had not been adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court prior to the American Express case, can be used as a key step of the rule of reason to streamline the complex economic efficiency analysis. This enables it to be applied in antitrust cases in digital market. The U.S. case law practice has established standards and procedures for the application of the less restrictive alternatives test, making it smoothly applied and thus supported by antitrust scholarship. Because of its ability to simplify the measurement of competitive gains and losses under the rule of reason, the test can achieve the dual goal of antitrust in digital markets, i.e., to maintain healthy market competition while maximizing the economic efficiencies of business conducts at the same time. Moreover, because the test is highly compatible with the dynamic and complex digital market competition, it can effectively reduce the ambiguity and arbitrariness of the rule of reason at the present stage in China. It can also improve the precision and efficiency of antitrust enforcement in the digital market. Nevertheless, the antitrust authorities and courts also need to take this test meticulously, as mistakes in the proposal of comparable alternatives could lead to false positive errors and in turn stifle sound business practices. From the perspective of legal principles, the test embodies the proportional quality inherent in the rule of reason; at the level of legal rules, the test could be systematically interpreted in the provisions involving the analysis of the theory of harm of cartels, abuse of dominant position and mergers; in terms of the specific implementation of the law, it is necessary to closely combine with the double-or multi-sided feature, diversified economic efficiency, and innovative and dynamic characteristics of the digital market when determining the effects of the behavior at issue. However, due to the shortcomings of the test and the difference of its meanings between the ancillary restraint doctrine and the general rule of reason, it is nonetheless necessary to untangle the levels and limits of its application.

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引用本文

赵泽宇.数字市场反垄断适用较小限制性替代措施测试[J].重庆大学学报社会科学版,2024,30(5):235-248. DOI:10.11835/j. issn.1008-5831. fx.2022.10.003

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  • 在线发布日期: 2024-11-12
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