中国特色央地关系下的区域经济治理
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作者单位:

1.浙江科技大学 经济学院,浙江 杭州 310023;2.浙江大学,国家战略与区域发展研究院,浙江 嘉兴 314102;3.浙江大学,长三角智慧绿洲创新中心未来区域发展实验室,浙江 嘉兴 314102

作者简介:

李霁霞,浙江科技大学经济学院讲师;Email:lijixia@zju.edu.cn
董雪兵,浙江大学国家战略与区域发展研究院副院长,浙江大学长三角智慧绿洲创新中心未来区域发展实验室主任,教授,博士研究生导师,Email:dxb@zju.edu.cn。

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中图分类号:

F207;F124

基金项目:

浙江省哲学社会科学规划青年课题(24NDQN064YB)


Regional economic governance under the Chinese central-local relationship
Author:
Affiliation:

1.School of Economics, Zhejiang University of Science and Technology, Hangzhou 310023, P.R.China;2.Institute of National Strategy and Regional Development, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058,P. R. China, Zhejiang University, Jiaxing 314102, P.R.China;3.Future Regional Development Laboratory of Innovation Center of Yangtze River Delta, Zhejiang University, Jiaxing 314102, P.R.China

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    摘要:

    央地关系是区域经济治理的制度基础,决定了区域竞争与合作行为的激励和约束条件。中国特色央地制度具有动态适应性和治理效能,通过财政税务、行政管理、官员考核等机制设计,调整区域经济行为的条件集合,满足不同历史阶段的国情需求和区域发展目标。一方面,中央将阶段性区域经济发展目标嵌入地方激励机制,引导区域竞争策略转变,包括竞争标的从“为增长而竞争”转向“为发展而竞争”,支出行为从“重建设、轻民生”转向“基本公共服务均等化”,发展模式从“地方保护”转向“发挥比较优势”,以区域竞争激励和竞争策略优化提升区域经济治理效率。另一方面,中央通过对口支援、一体化合作、主体功能区建设等制度安排,在保留区域竞争激励的同时,降低区域合作成本,提高区域合作收益,形成优势互补、规模效益最大化、外部性内部化等跨区域合作模式,实现国家治理和区域治理效率的统一。在区域经济格局深刻变革与国内发展目标转型升级的背景下,区域经济治理面临新形势与新挑战。未来区域经济治理研究应聚焦数字时代区域协调发展、因地制宜发展新质生产力、构建全国统一大市场等重大现实问题,从新治理主体、新发展目标、新治理工具等维度深化探索,进一步丰富和完善中国特色区域经济治理理论体系,为新时代区域协调发展与区域高质量发展提供学理支撑。

    Abstract:

    The central-local relationship serves as the institutional foundation for regional economic governance, shaping the incentives and constraints for regional competition and cooperation. The Chinese central-local system is characterized by dynamic adaptability and governance efficiency. Through mechanisms such as fiscal and taxation policies, administrative management, and official performance evaluations, it adjusts the conditions for regional economic behavior to meet the demands of specific historical stages and regional development goals. On one hand, the central government embeds regional economic development objectives into local incentive mechanisms, guiding the transformation of regional competition strategies. This includes shifting the focus of competition from competing for growth to competing for development, expenditure behavior from prioritizing infrastructure over public welfare to equalizing basic public services, and development models from local protectionism to leveraging comparative advantages. These adjustments enhance regional economic governance efficiency through optimized competition incentives and strategies. On the other hand, through institutional arrangements such as counterpart support, integrated cooperation, and the construction of major functional zones, the central government reduces the costs of regional cooperation while retaining competition incentives, thereby increasing cooperation benefits. This fosters complementary advantages, maximizes scale economies, and internalizes externalities, achieving cross-regional cooperation models that align national and regional governance efficiencies. Against the backdrop of profound changes in the regional economic landscape and the transformation of domestic development goals, regional economic governance faces new circumstances and challenges. In the future, it is necessary to focus on key practical issues such as coordinated regional development in the digital era, developing new quality productive forces tailored to local conditions, and the construction of a unified national market. By innovating regional economic governance research from the dimensions of new governance entities, new development goals, and new governance tools, we can further enrich and refine the theoretical system of Chinese regional economic governance, providing theoretical support for coordinated regional development and high-quality regional development in the new era.

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引用本文

李霁霞,董雪兵.中国特色央地关系下的区域经济治理[J].重庆大学学报社会科学版,2026,32(2):14-26. DOI:10.11835/j. issn.1008-5831. jg.2026.03.002

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  • 在线发布日期: 2026-05-27
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