Government’s original intention of property tax reformation was to inhibit housing speculation, rather than seize benefit from local resident.Whether local government’s property tax policy was valid depended on tax receipt and residents’ welfare. By quantifying them to set local government’s objective function, also quantifying the speculation revenue to set estate speculators’ objective function, Stackelberg differential game model was available to analyze the government’s dynamic optimal tax rate strategy, as well as speculators’ dynamic optimal house hoarding ratio strategy. The government’s operative norms are elaborated and several main conclusions are obtained: 1)Local government’s dynamic optimal adjustment of property tax rate should be synchronized with speculators’ actions as possible; 2)Rate adjustment should follow: improper too long interval, each time slight variation, consistent varying tendency; 3)Even if the house-hoarding behaviors disappear, property tax still would not be abolished. It is appropriate to maintain a dynamic critical rate for just inhibiting the motivation of house-hoarding; 4)In order to avoid property tax is transferred, high rate should be adopted at the very beginning of property tax reformation.