高管权力与股票期权计划实证研究
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教育部人文社科类青年项目“大股东控制下的股权结构对企业R&D投资行为的影响研究(11YJC630139)


An Empirical Study on Executive Power and Plan of Stock Option
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    摘要:

    由于上市公司ESO激励计划“乱象丛生”,人们日益关注其推出动因。文章以2006年到2009年上市公司为样本,从高管权力、公司特征、外部环境对公司推出ESO计划的动因进行了研究,发现公司高管权力、公司规模、资金流动性越高,公司越有冲动推出ESO计划;公司股权结构越集中、财务杠杆越高,则有抑制ESO计划推出的倾向;公司风险与ESO计划之间呈凹性关系,表明风险过高和过低都不利于ESO计划的推出。

    Abstract:

    For the mess brought by the ESO plans of corporation, relevant persons pay more and more attention to their motives. So, we take the data of listed corporation during 2006-2009 as a sample, and focus on its motives such as executive power, peculiarity and the external surroundings.The analysis finds that power intensity of the executives, the scale of company and liquidity are positively related to the possibility that a corporation introduces ESO plan. We also find that the ownership concentration and financial leverage are negatively related to the probability of ESO plan launched. Just as we expected, the concave relationship between the risk and ESO plan shows that either high or low risk tends to launch ESO plan. According to our research conclusion, we probe into the balance mechanism of ESO interests, and come up with some recommendation of improving mechanism of listed corporation launching ESO in China.

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赵青华,黄登仕.高管权力与股票期权计划实证研究[J].重庆大学学报社会科学版,2013,19(3):65-72. DOI:10.11835/j. issn.1008-5831.2013.03.011

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  • 在线发布日期: 2013-05-17
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