Based on evolutionary game theory, we analyze the interactive behavior of land use in urbanized areas and agricultural areas and simulate with empirical data. The difference of the proportion of economic growth and cultivated land protection in different regions should be large enough to reduce the non-cooperative land use among region of different resource endowments. The "big stick" policy helps promote cooperation among local governments, and the carrot policy based on the "big stick" policy is more effective. Non-marketization of land expropriation compensation price is not conducive to local governments to implement land intensive use of cooperation. Therefore, promoting the intensive use of construction land needs to focus on allocating land resources according to the land use efficiency, establishing the land intensive use incentive mechanism on the punishment mechanism, and realizing the full market circulation of the surplus land index, promoting land acquisition compensation price marketization, in accordance with different areas to implement a large enough differential performance evaluation system. In the long run, it is necessary to use zoning control instead of index control to promote intensive use of construction land.