During the third stage of China' initial public offering (IPO) mechanism reform, regulators carried out a series of administrative interventions aimed at over-financing, P/E ratio and secondary offering problems. Focusing on the disagreement between the first and secondary market, and IPO pricing efficiency, the empirical results suggest that, firstly, administrative intervention improved the intrinsic value pricing efficiency, but substantially reduced the transaction value pricing efficiency, under the circumstances of widespread premium of IPO price over the equity value; secondly, administrative intervention enlarged the disagreement in equity pricing between the first and secondary market, which formed an institutional profit transfer channel. The research results indicate that the administrative interventions on IPO pricing interrupt the marketization process of the third stage of China's IPO mechanism reform. IPO mechanism reform in the future should adhere to the market-oriented direction, target at improvement of pricing efficiency and handle the relationship between the interests of financiers and investors properly.