Research on Constitutional Allocation of Monetary Policy Power
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    Abstract:

    Although Fiat money does not have any substantial intrinsic value,its credit is based on the issuer’s promise of its purchasing power through money contract. This promise is the ground and precondition to establish the goal and binding force of the monetary policy power. Monetary policy could potentially conflict with other macroeconomic policy,and the monetary policy power has the risk of being captured by other financial institutions. In order to protect the rights of moneyholders,it is necessary to put the monetary policy power under the mechanism of constitutional supervision so as to keep the monetary policy relatively independent. Achieving this object needs effective allocation of monetary policy power on the constitutional level. The main measures are: to safeguard moneyholder’s right to be involved in the decisionmaking and auditing about money,to control the power of money administrations to make monetary policy,to confine the macroregulation powers of administrative agencies,to constrain the soft money powers of financial institutions.

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单飞跃,鲁勇睿.货币政策权力的宪法性配置研究[J].重庆大学学报社会科学版,2011,17(3):109~115

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