建筑市场激励机制设计
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F062.4

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Design for the Incentive System of Architecture Market
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    摘要:

    建筑市场是一个典型的不完全信息博弈市场。这个市场由开发商、监理单位与承包商三位主体构成,他们之间存在着复杂的委托一代理关系。通过对这种特殊的委托一代理关系的分析,构造了两个不完全信息动态博弈模型,并对这两个模型进行了比较分析。结果表明,如果开发商只支付监理单位固定费用,监理单位将采取弱力度监督,只有当开发商给予监理单位适当激励时,监理单位才会采取强有力监督。并在此基础上,得出了开发商对监理单位的有效激励机制,以促使监理单位和承包商努力工作,从而实现开发商预期目标。

    Abstract:

    Architecture market is a typical dynamic game market with incomplete information, in which exists three principal parts who are proprietors, supervising companies and contractors. There is a complex principal-agent relationship among them. With the analysis of the principal-agent relationship among proprietors, supervising companies and contractors, two dynamic games of incomplete information have been established and analyzed. If the proprietor only pay instant fee to supervising company, the supervising company will take weak supervise. Only with appropriate incentive way, the strong supervise can be done. Based on it, an incentive system is established to make the supervising companies and contractors work hard, to realize the given purpose of the proprietors.

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田盈 蒲勇健.建筑市场激励机制设计[J].重庆大学学报,2003,26(10):140-142.

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  • 最后修改日期:2003-04-05
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