信息不对称下医患关系博弈分析
DOI:
CSTR:
作者:
作者单位:

作者简介:

通讯作者:

中图分类号:

F224.32

基金项目:

重庆市软科学基金


Game of Hospital-tient Relationship Under Asymmetric Information
Author:
Affiliation:

Fund Project:

  • 摘要
  • |
  • 图/表
  • |
  • 访问统计
  • |
  • 参考文献
  • |
  • 相似文献
  • |
  • 引证文献
  • |
  • 资源附件
  • |
  • 文章评论
    摘要:

    医疗市场中医患双方处于信息高度不对称状态,这将导致道德风险和逆向选择,降低市场效率.通过建立博弈模型,对信息不对称下医患双方的博弈过程及均衡结果进行了分析,并提出了相应对策建议.分析表明,医患信息高度不对称不利于患者的利益及医疗市场的发展,应当建立医疗信息公示制度,加强医患沟通,缓解医患信息不对称状态.

    Abstract:

    The hospital and patient are in the state of asymmetric information in the medical market, which could lead to moral hazard, adverse selection, and low market efficiency. By the game model, we analyze the game process and equilibrium between the hospital and patient under the condition of asymmetric information. The analyzing result suggest that asymmetric information in the medical market is harmful to the patient's benefit and the development of the medical market. Therefore, it's necessary to set up medical information opening system and strengthen the communication between the hospital and the patient so as to relieve the asymmetric information between hospital and patient.

    参考文献
    相似文献
    引证文献
引用本文

弓宪文,王勇,李廷玉.信息不对称下医患关系博弈分析[J].重庆大学学报,2004,27(4):126-129.

复制
分享
文章指标
  • 点击次数:
  • 下载次数:
  • HTML阅读次数:
  • 引用次数:
历史
  • 收稿日期:
  • 最后修改日期:2003-02-25
  • 录用日期:
  • 在线发布日期:
  • 出版日期:
文章二维码