不完全信息下中央银行与商业银行的博弈分析
中图分类号:

F832.33


Game Analysis Between Center Bank and Commercial Banks Under Asymmetric Information
  • 摘要
  • | |
  • 访问统计
  • | |
  • 相似文献 [20]
  • |
  • 引证文献
  • | |
  • 文章评论
    摘要:

    现代经济生活离不开货币,而货币是由银行体系创造的,因此银行作为一个国家金融机构的主体,对国民经济生活有着极其重要的影响.中央银行作为货币政策的制定与执行者,在整个金融体系之中起着核心作用,而货币政策的有效性必须依赖于商业银行的积极性.文章基于货币政策传导机制理论,分析了在信息不完全情况下,如何建立一种契约关系以使商业银行可以积极地向着中央银行的货币政策目标努力,为中国金融体制的改革奠定了理论基础.

    Abstract:

    Modern economy depends on money,but money is created by the bank system.So,as the main body of finance institution in one state,banks have the importance influence upon the economy of one country.Center bank constitutes the money policy and executes the money policy in one country,then it is the core of the whole financial system.But the validity for the money policy must rely on the activity of commercial banks to the money policy.Being based on the money policy transmitting mechanism,this Article analyzes how to establish a kind of bargain relation between Center bank and commercial bank so that commercial bank may work hard toward the aim of the money policy for the center bank under the asymmetric information,which was the bases of the Commercial Banks' innovation.

    参考文献
    网友评论
    网友评论
    分享到微博
    发 布
引用本文

袁境,蒲勇健.不完全信息下中央银行与商业银行的博弈分析[J].重庆大学学报,2005,28(12):143-147.

复制
分享
文章指标
  • 点击次数:821
  • 下载次数: 1312
  • HTML阅读次数: 0
  • 引用次数: 0
历史
  • 收稿日期:2005-07-10
  • 最后修改日期:2005-07-10
文章二维码