股票期权的商业银行经理人筛选及团队合作机制
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F830.33

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教育部人文社会科学规划项目 , 高等学校博士学科点专项科研项目


Research on Market Targeting Model of Selecting Manager and Cooperation Mechanism in Commercial Bank Based on Stock Option
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    摘要:

    经理人选择和提高团队合作效率是建立有效的商业银行人力资源管理制度框架的两大基础性课题,但传统方法在解释参与人合作及所体现的博弈理论方面存在局限性.笔者构造导入股票期权制度的经理人市场筛选和基于股票期权的团队合作博弈模型,建立商业银行经理人识别模式和团队合作机制.发现由于股票期权激励机制能够将经理人薪酬中的固定部分降低,并相应以不确定性风险收入替代,进而能够遴选出有能力的经理人而过滤掉低能力的经理人;而股东的最优剩余收益分配所占比例小于团队剩余收益的一半时,员工持股计划和经理人实行股票期权制能对整个团队产生足够的激励.

    Abstract:

    Selecting manager by market and improving team cooperation efficiency are two basal tasks to construct an effective human resource management system of commercial bank in China,but there are the limitations the traditional methods in explaining the players' cooperation.The paper constructs a market targeting model of selecting manager of commercial bank and a game model of team cooperation based on stock option,and then the talent identification mode and team cooperation mechanism in commercial bank are established.It is concluded that talented managers is selected but talent-less is refused owing to stock option incentive mechanism,and employee and managers holding stock plan is an incentive force to whole team if residual remains of shareholder is less than half team residual remains.

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彭小兵,万丽娟,马泉.股票期权的商业银行经理人筛选及团队合作机制[J].重庆大学学报,2005,28(9):144-147.

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  • 收稿日期:2005-05-25
  • 最后修改日期:2005-05-25
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