价格折扣下的纵向合作广告博弈分析
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F224.32

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Game Analysis of Vertical Cooperative Advertising with Price Discount
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    摘要:

    研究了厂商向消费者提供一个价格折扣时的两级供应链合作广告问题,先后讨论和比较了两阶段博弈与协同合作博弈时的均衡结果.结果表明,在特定条件下,厂商若直接给予消费者更多的折扣,零售商将提高地方性广告努力水平.对于给定的价格折扣,合作情形下的整条供应链利润总是大于非合作情形下的系统总利润.而且价格折扣只适合于富有弹性的商品.运用了Nash讨价还价模型来决定整个系统利润增量的分配.最后,通过一个数值算例验证了上述结论.

    Abstract:

    This paper studies the problem of cooperative advertising of two-echelon supply chain when the manufacturer offers a price deduction to consumers. And the equilibrium outcomes in a two-stage game and a coordinated co-op game are discussed and compared respectively. The results demonstrate that, under a certain condition, the retailer will increase local advertising effort if the manufacturer offers more price discount to customers directly. For any given price discount, the total profit for the supply chain with cooperative scheme is always higher than that with the non-cooperative scheme, and we find that the price discount will only be suitable for the merchandise with price sensitive demand. Then the Nash bargaining model is utilized to determine the allocation of the entire system profit gain. Finally, a numerical example is given to confirm the above conclusion.

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傅强,曾顺秋.价格折扣下的纵向合作广告博弈分析[J].重庆大学学报,2007,30(9):148-153.

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  • 最后修改日期:2007-05-10
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