Abstract:Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, General Secretary Xi Jinping has delivered a series of important speeches and issued a series of important instructions on education, which systematically elaborate on a series of new concepts, new ideas, and new perspectives on education, forming General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important expositions on education. These important expositions represent the latest achievements in integrating the basic principles of Marxism with China’s education practice. They have greatly advanced the development of an independent knowledge system for education with Chinese characteristics, provided a powerful ideological weapon and action guide for accelerating the modernization of education and building an educationally powerful nation, and made significant original contributions. These contributions are mainly embodied in: Firstly, from the perspective of axiology, they clarify the strategic positioning of education in the overall development of the Party and the country, providing innovative answers to the question of why educate in the new era across four dimensions: political value, economic value, cultural value, social value and innovative value. Secondly, from the perspective of epistemology, they endow the development of education in the new era with multiple connotations, profoundly revealing its fundamental nature, fundamental guarantee, fundamental tasks, historical missions, and ultimate goals, and innovatively answering the fundamental question of what kind of education to run in the new era. Thirdly， from the perspective of methodology， based on China’s basic national conditions and following the laws of education, they propose the overall thinking and strategic deployment for deepening education reform and innovation, covering the establishment of education’s status, the choice of educational paths, the stimulation of educational momentum, the planning of educational pathways, and the cultivation of educational entities, innovatively answering the question of how to run education in the new era.

Abstract:The central-local relationship serves as the institutional foundation for regional economic governance, shaping the incentives and constraints for regional competition and cooperation. The Chinese central-local system is characterized by dynamic adaptability and governance efficiency. Through mechanisms such as fiscal and taxation policies, administrative management, and official performance evaluations, it adjusts the conditions for regional economic behavior to meet the demands of specific historical stages and regional development goals. On one hand, the central government embeds regional economic development objectives into local incentive mechanisms, guiding the transformation of regional competition strategies. This includes shifting the focus of competition from competing for growth to competing for development, expenditure behavior from prioritizing infrastructure over public welfare to equalizing basic public services, and development models from local protectionism to leveraging comparative advantages. These adjustments enhance regional economic governance efficiency through optimized competition incentives and strategies. On the other hand, through institutional arrangements such as counterpart support, integrated cooperation, and the construction of major functional zones, the central government reduces the costs of regional cooperation while retaining competition incentives, thereby increasing cooperation benefits. This fosters complementary advantages, maximizes scale economies, and internalizes externalities, achieving cross-regional cooperation models that align national and regional governance efficiencies. Against the backdrop of profound changes in the regional economic landscape and the transformation of domestic development goals, regional economic governance faces new circumstances and challenges. In the future, it is necessary to focus on key practical issues such as coordinated regional development in the digital era, developing new quality productive forces tailored to local conditions, and the construction of a unified national market. By innovating regional economic governance research from the dimensions of new governance entities, new development goals, and new governance tools, we can further enrich and refine the theoretical system of Chinese regional economic governance, providing theoretical support for coordinated regional development and high-quality regional development in the new era.

Abstract:Adjacent inter-provincial cooperative governance is a government governance strategy to reduce local protection and market segmentation under the administrative division system, and to promote the cross-regional flow of production factors. It is also an inherent part of provincial open governance and integrated urban-rural development. However, subject to the administrative boundaries of local governments’ governance powers and performance assessment for a long time, as well as the increasingly solidified local interests in the competitive development game, adjacent inter-provincial cooperative governance has become a blind area of government governance or a selective autonomous behavior. In 2020, the state proposed to build a new development pattern, which aims to expand domestic demand, unblocking economic circulation, and building a unified national market. This policy provides a new opportunity for adjacent inter-provincial cooperative governance, and the exploration of specific path strategies has become an important issue under the construction of a new development pattern. Based on the theory of collaborative governance and the Chinese governance context, this paper constructs an analysis framework of consensus–organization–action for adjacent inter-provincial collaborative governance, selects Chongqing–Guizhou collaborative governance as a case, uses semi-structured interview method to collect data, and explores the path strategy of inter-provincial collaborative governance under the new development pattern. It is found that adjacent inter-provincial collaborative governance is a multi-dimensional systematic governance action process in which stakeholders of neighboring provinces (autonomous regions or municipalities) build a decentralized collaborative organization system based on and guided by collaborative consensus. Under the new development pattern, the path strategy of adjacent inter-provincial collaborative governance should first clarify the requirements of national strategic policies, the needs of inter-provincial cooperative development, the expectations of market players and the public, and gather the consensus of relevant stakeholders on collaborative governance. Second, connect national strategic policies and provincial governance plans, build a decentralized overall layout, and make a good first hand in the collaborative development of adjacent areas and self-organization. Third, give play to the relative advantages and complementary functions of horizontal coordination, longitudinal management, and network governance, hold the cattle nose project, and focus on improving mechanisms for opening up and cooperation as well as joint ecological protection and governance, promote the integration of infrastructure and basic public services, promote the integration and upgrading of industrial chains, and prevent urban and rural poverty return and promote integrated development. Such a path strategy provides a systematic innovation blueprint and action plan for adjacent inter-provincial cooperative governance in the new development pattern, helps to improve the efficiency and sustainability of inter-provincial cooperative governance under the administrative division system, and can also promote the construction of a unified national market and coordinated regional development in the open governance of provinces.

Abstract:Currently, multiple forces including globalization and localization, digital transformation and industrial restructuring, new urbanization and rural revitalization, sustainable development and modernization of social governance are intricately intertwined, transforming regional and urban development into a dynamic equilibrium process under multiple objectives and constraints. Within this context, new concepts, requirements, and domains continuously emerge, forming cross-cutting composite concepts expressed as “B from A perspective”， “B oriented toward A”， or “B based on A”. These concepts transcend simple aggregation of existing notions, embodying new objectives, relationship norms, or operational scopes, representing novel cognitive approaches to complex regional and urban challenges. Nevertheless, academic research on comprehensive evaluation of such complex concepts remains relatively underdeveloped: conceptual definitions lack systematic clarity, failing to fully elucidate transformative connotations following the introduction of limiting conditions or lacking operationality; indicator system construction remains subjective, without unified design principles or construction paradigms, inadequately reflecting multi-dimensional cross-attributes between conceptual sub-dimensions; indicator selection lacks comprehensiveness and efficacy, insufficiently covering key aspects of conceptual connotations and lacking systematic verification. This paper aims to address this research gap by proposing the “C-P-I” framework for regional and urban studies, systematically analyzing comprehensive evaluation systems for composite concepts across three dimensions. First, regarding precise conceptual definition, we emphasize crosscutting characteristics, namely accurately revealing the essential nature generated through interactions between A and B and their sub-dimensions; we emphasize specificity, namely anchoring particular scenarios, issues, and core relationships served by the concept; and we emphasize consistency, namely ensuring logical coherence between conceptual definition and measurement operations. Second, regarding scientific indicator system construction, we employ multi-dimensional crossing principles to characterize cross-unit level interactions; hierarchical decomposition principles to establish systematic structures from purpose layer to scenario layer, element layer, observation layer, indicator layer, and explanation layer; and normative-positive integration principles to unify theoretical ideals with empirical measurements. Third, regarding credible indicator selection, we emphasize comprehensiveness to fully encompass conceptual connotations; compositeness to reflect cross-interactive characteristics of concepts; and validity to ensure indicator quality and system robustness through rigorous testing. This framework not only provides tools for evaluating complex concepts but also embodies mechanisms promoting discovery and reproduction of complex concepts. It advances regional analysis from traditional, relatively static, and uni-dimensional models toward more dynamic, integrated, and precise comprehension of complexity, offering more effective theoretical instruments and methodological support for deepening regional understanding and serving regional practices.

Abstract:In the face of negative population growth, correctly understanding the issue of demographic dividend is an important prerequisite for accurately grasping the relationship between China’s population and economy in the new era. The concept of innovative, coordinated, green, open and shared development is not only a guiding principle for leading high-quality development, but also a novel perspective for examining the comprehensive demographic dividend. From the perspective of its connotation and characteristics, the comprehensive demographic dividend in the new era is an extension and expansion of the traditional demographic dividend theory in terms of development foundation, core concepts and value pursuit. It is based on China’s new historical orientation and development process, takes population conditions such as size, structure, quality and distribution as the foundation, and guided by the new development philosophy. Through adaptive adjustment of policies and measures, the demographic advantages can be cultivated, consolidated and reaped, promoting the internal balance and external coordination of the population and economic system, and laying a solid demographic foundation for high-quality development. The concept of comprehensive demographic dividend is systematic, phased and unified, and its foundation is population, the key is comprehensiveness, and the core is dividends. From internal logic, the total size, age structure, comprehensive quality, and spatial distribution of the population are important components of the comprehensive demographic dividend. Although there are still practical obstacles to the release of demographic advantages, we can fully leverage the positive role of population factors in promoting high-quality development by taking advantage of the existing demographic conditions and opportunities of demographic transformation based on the interactive relationship between population and economy. In the process of Chinese modernization, we should not only realize the current reality of negative population growth and fully tap and utilize the existing demographic conditions, but also look to the future trends of population development, and actively explore and cultivate the demographic advantages of structure optimization, quality improvement and reasonable distribution. We should take the adjustment and improvement of relevant policies and systems as the path to guide population development to conform to the demands of the new development philosophy, so as to actively respond to the trend characteristics of population development and the goals and tasks of high-quality development. By further improving policies on childbirth and elderly care, promoting the construction of a strong educational system, and optimizing the urban pattern system, high-quality development of population and economy can be realized and provide strong support for Chinese modernization.

Abstract:Against the backdrop of high-quality economic development and the deep implementation of China’s strategy on developing a quality workforce， household investment in education has become the core channel for transforming household capital into human capital and driving the continuous release of the talent dividend. Meanwhile， China’s household leverage ratio has risen rapidly, and the contradiction between debt pressure and rigid educational investment has become increasingly prominent. Their interactive relationship directly affects the efficiency of human capital accumulation, educational equity, and household financial stability. Most existing studies focus on the impact of household leverage on aggregate consumption, rarely conduct in-depth analyses of its mechanism on educational investment, and generally overlook the comprehensive moderating effects of household economic, social, and cultural capital as well as multi-dimensional heterogeneity. Based on this, this paper constructs a pooled cross-sectional sample using data from the 2017 and 2019 China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), and adopts a fixed-effects model to examine the impact of household leverage on household educational investment, so as to provide empirical evidence for optimizing household financial decisions, improving public education policies, and preventing household debt risks. The empirical results show that, first, at the full-sample level, an increase in household leverage raises educational investment, and this conclusion remains robust after replacing the measurement of core variables, excluding childless and debt-free households, and addressing endogeneity by using regional average leverage as an instrumental variable; second, in terms of the moderating effect, the positive impact of household leverage on educational investment weakens as household capital increases, indicating that capital-abundant households can meet educational needs with their own resources and reduce reliance on debt financing; third, heterogeneity analysis reveals that households with lower debt diversification, those relying mainly on internal financing, those with three or more children, those with higher digitalization levels, and those located in the central and western regions as well as urban areas tend to increase educational investment more significantly when leverage rises; fourth, further discussion confirms an inverted U-shaped nonlinear relationship between household leverage and educational investment, where rising leverage encourages households to increase educational input under light financial pressure but reduces educational expenditure under excessive financial burden, suggesting that moderate leverage eases liquidity constraints and supports educational investment while financial stress caused by over-indebtedness significantly reduces educational spending. This paper puts forward suggestions from four perspectives: guiding households to make rational educational investment plans, improving the quality of public education resources, enhancing households’ capital accumulation capacity and diversified financing channels， and building a targeted educational support policy system. Focusing on the pathway of transforming household capital into human capital, it expands and empirically tests the theoretical framework of how household leverage affects educational investment. It highlights the heterogeneity of educational investment decisions under household leverage, providing a new perspective for understanding household educational investment decisions under economic pressure.

Abstract:The Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development explicitly calls for accelerating high-level self-reliance and self-strengthening in science and technology, promoting the agglomeration of innovation resources toward enterprises, and deepening the integration of the innovation chain, industrial chain, capital chain, and talent chain—thereby providing strategic guidance for enhancing the efficiency of financial support to high-tech industries. While it is widely acknowledged in both academic and industrial circles that improved financial support efficiency contributes to the expansion of the technology market, the reverse relationship remains insufficiently examined and requires systematic empirical validation. A critical barrier lies in information asymmetries among key stakeholders in high-tech finance, including government agencies, financial institutions, and high-tech enterprises, particularly concerning the valuation of technological assets, R&D progress, and the commercialization of research outcomes. These asymmetries result in inefficient allocation, misallocation, or even arbitrary deployment of financial resources, perpetuating entrenched financing constraints. Meanwhile, sustained policy support has driven a significant expansion of China’s technology market, generating an expansion effect that may serve as a new pathway to mitigate these financing challenges. This study investigates this dynamic from an integrated meso-micro perspective, linking the functional mechanisms of the technology market with the financing needs of high-tech enterprises. It delineates the theoretical pathways through which technology market scale expansion enhances financial support efficiency, constructs an evaluation framework for such efficiency, and employs a super-efficiency SBM model combined with a two-way fixed effects model to analyze provincial panel data from 2013 to 2022. The empirical results confirm a significantly positive effect of technology market expansion on financial support efficiency, a finding robust to multiple sensitivity checks. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that the magnitude of this effect diminishes progressively from economically developed to less developed and underdeveloped regions. Furthermore, industrial structure upgrading strengthens the positive impact of market expansion, while collaborative innovation serves as a key mediating mechanism through which market growth improves financial efficiency. Policy implications suggest that governments should prioritize technology market development, implement differentiated regulatory and incentive policies, and actively foster industry-university-research collaboration and structural transformation to amplify the market’s expansion effect. By embedding the technology market’s expansion effect into the complex ecosystem involving financial services and technological innovation across multiple stakeholders, this study extends the theoretical understanding of how markets mediate financial resource allocation in high-tech sectors. Practically, it offers empirical grounding for policymakers to harness market-driven forces and provides actionable insights for financial institutions and enterprises seeking to leverage the policy dividends associated with technology market growth.

Abstract:Against the backdrop of the ongoing technological revolution and industrial transformation, the driving force of the digital economy has been continuously strengthening, with digital technology innovation emerging as a core driver of future development. Chinese enterprises, however, still face numerous challenges, including high risks and partial blockages in industrial and supply chains, which necessitate targeted policy support from the government. This paper uses an analytical framework based on the technological, organizational, and environmental dimensions, employing data from A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2015 to 2022. Various econometric models, including the two-way fixed effects model and moderation effect model, are used to analyze the mechanism through which government procurement affects enterprise digital technology innovation. Additionally, the paper explores the impact of industrial and supply chain resilience on the effectiveness of government procurement in driving innovation. The results show that government procurement policies significantly promote enterprise digital technology innovation, a conclusion that is robustly verified through a series of endogeneity and robustness tests, including instrumental variables, propensity score matching (PSM), Heckman two-stage estimation, variable substitution, and alternative econometric models. The mechanism analysis reveals that government procurement optimizes the allocation of digital assets, enhances digital talent reserves, and reduces R&D uncertainty, thereby incentivizing firms to innovate in digital technologies. Further research indicates that industrial and supply chain resilience plays a crucial role in enhancing the impact of government procurement on digital technology innovation. Specifically, improving the resistance and recovery characteristics of supply-demand relationships within the industrial and supply chains—between the government, enterprises, and among enterprises—can effectively reduce risks and uncertainties during policy implementation, ensuring the smooth achievement of government procurement policy objectives. From a regional perspective, the analysis shows that the effectiveness of government procurement in incentivizing digital technology innovation is influenced by the geographic location of enterprises and the attributes of procurement regions. Enterprises in eastern region, in particular, receive more significant incentives from central government procurement. In the context of urban agglomeration development, government procurement within cities and urban agglomerations primarily promotes innovation in enterprises located in central cities, while procurement outside these agglomerations tends to incentivize digital technology innovation in peripheral city enterprises. The findings of this paper provide theoretical and empirical support for optimizing government procurement policies, thus effectively incentivizing enterprise digital technology innovation. This has significant implications for driving the development of digital economy through digital technology innovation and enhancing industrial and supply chain resilience.

Abstract:As China enters the “15th Five-Year Plan” period, its socialist modernization drive has reached a critical stage of surmounting major obstacles and tackling tough challenges. The traditional extensive growth model, which relies solely on material capital accumulation, can no longer meet the demands of high-quality development. How to achieve the close integration between investment in goods and investment in people, thereby stimulating new quality productive forces and enhancing total factor productivity, has become a core proposition that urgently needs to be addressed. This paper constructs a multi-level indicator system. The investment-in-goods level primarily comprises three dimensions: digital-intelligent infrastructure investment, ecological and environmental protection investment, and real economy investment. The investment-in-people level mainly consists of four dimensions: education and talent cultivation investment, health protection investment, employment and job utilization investment, and social security support investment. The entropy weight method is employed for measurement, and the coupling coordination degree model is applied to evaluate the close integration level between investment in goods and investment in people. Using panel data from 284 prefecture-level cities in China from 2013 to 2023 as the sample, and incorporating models such as the Dagum Gini coefficient, kernel density estimation, spatiotemporal Markov chain, and convergence models, this study systematically examines the regional disparities and spatiotemporal evolution characteristics of the close integration level between investment in goods and investment in people. The results indicate that the close integration level between investment in goods and investment in people exhibits a sustained upward trend, with the steady increase in the investment-in-people level serving as the primary driving force, while the growth rate of the investment-in-goods level has slowed in the later period. Regional differences mainly originate from changes in the transvariation density of the Gini coefficient. Further decomposition using the Theil index reveals that inter-provincial differences constitute the main source of regional disparities in the close integration level. The close integration level demonstrates significant positive spatial correlation across regions, forming a core-periphery structure and exhibiting lag effects. Markov chain analysis shows that the state transition paths of the close integration level between investment in goods and investment in people exhibit strong path dependence. The probability of low-level regions transitioning upward to higher levels has gradually increased, while high-level regions display a pronounced locking effect. Convergence analysis reveals that although the close integration level between investment in goods and investment in people displays σ-convergence characteristics across regions, it has not achieved fully synchronized convergence. Spatial β-convergence analysis indicates the existence of both absolute and conditional β-convergence. The eastern region exhibits the fastest convergence speed, while the central region is the slowest. After incorporating control variables, the overall convergence speed slightly decreases. Based on these findings, the paper proposes policy recommendations such as strengthening regional coordination, promoting the synergistic "people-goods" development mechanism, facilitating cross-regional collaboration, and optimizing convergence pathways, so as to further elevate the close integration level between investment in goods and investment in people.

Abstract:With the rapid spread of new technologies with AI as the core, AI, as the main factor of new quality productivity, is deconstructing traditional production relations and production practice patterns in a revolutionary way, and accelerating the reshaping of the global governance pattern. Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core has attached great importance to and made systematic plans for the development of AI. The Recommendations for the 15th Five-Year Plan have incorporated the development of AI and digital-intelligence empowerment into the national strategic layout, and the 2026 Government Work Report put forward for the first time the goal of creating new forms of smart economy. The construction of international rules for AI is a key arena for major-country competition and global cooperation, and a core link in improving the global AI governance system. Its fundamental goal is to mitigate systemic risks that may arise from the global diffusion of AI technologies through institutional arrangements, provide institutional safeguards for forging new forms of smart economy, and advance global AI governance toward greater fairness, rationality, inclusiveness and order.Institutional lag, technological monopoly, discourse hegemony, and the alienation of power have created uncertainty and risks for global governance and the development of new forms of smart economy in the era of AI. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Plus Meeting, General Secretary Xi Jinping put forward the Global Governance Initiative for the first time, with the core concepts of upholding sovereign equality, abiding by international rule of law, practicing multilateralism, advocating a people-centered approach, and emphasizing action orientation, provides fundamental guidance for improving the global governance system and forging new forms of smart economy. The construction of international rules for AI is an important part of global governance.To deepen the effective alignment and scientific adaptation between the development of international rules on AI and the advancement of AI as a productive force is an inevitable requirement for ensuring the harmony and stability of production relations, the sustained progress of productive forces in the global digital economy era, and consolidating the foundation for the development of the smart economy.Promoting the international rules of AI to be good is an inherent requirement for regulating the reckless expansion of capital logic, safeguarding the common interests of all humanity, and supporting the sound development of new forms of smart economy. It is urgent to establish an institutional link between the globalization of AI technology, the vision of a community with a shared future for mankind, and the new forms of smart economy, so as to transcend the illusory community with a genuine community. However, under the domination of capital, there are some problems in the field of AI global governance, such as the goal alienation of value reversal, the structural alienation of power monopoly, and the discourse alienation of communication imbalance, which are disintegrating the foundation of protecting the public interests of technology, and making the international rules of AI, as the guardian of the public interests of global technology tottering and seriously hindering the development of new forms of smart economy and the evolution of the global landscape. As a responsible major country, China takes Marxism as its theoretical guidance and follows the important expositions of General Secretary Xi Jinping on the Global Governance Initiative. Focusing on the fundamental goals of creating new forms of smart economy and cultivating new quality productive forces in AI, China advocates in the practice of global AI governance: building an inclusive and shared rule foundation through the vision of a community with a shared future for mankind, regulating technological monopoly and power alienation with the theory of capital critique, and enhancing China’s institutional discourse power with historical materialism. It has explored a subjectivity-driven global governance approach for AI, contributing Eastern wisdom to improving the global AI governance system and providing an institutional path for forging new forms of smart economy and enabling digital and intelligent technologies to empower the common development of humanity.

Abstract:Building an independent knowledge system in China is a strategic proposition for accelerating the development of philosophy and social sciences with Chinese characteristics, which holds profound significance for enhancing China’s theoretical innovation and cultural soft power. As a representative of cutting-edge productive forces, artificial intelligence (AI), through its technological breakthroughs and independent innovation in academic research, not only provides methodological support for transforming the knowledge production paradigm in China’s philosophy and social sciences but also serves as a crucial focus for China to break Western technological monopolies and reduce excessive reliance on foreign academic pathways. Therefore, conducting research on the evaluation of China’s international academic discourse power in AI and establishing a comprehensive, diversified, and multi-level evaluation system will contribute to advancing the development of China’s philosophical and social sciences in terms of disciplinary, academic, and discursive systems. It will also facilitate the transformation and application of AI paper achievements and support the construction of China’s independent knowledge system. First, this paper focuses on Chinese AI papers as the research object. It conducts an in-depth analysis of the specific connotations and constituent elements of the evaluation dimensions for China’s international academic discourse power from four perspectives: academic influence, academic perception, academic communication, and academic leadership. Second, building on the dimensional analysis, the study draws on Foucault’s theory of discourse power, Fei Xiaotong’s theory of cultural self-awareness, and Braddock’s 7W model to explore the generative logic of international academic discourse power and clarify its underlying mechanisms. Third, by collecting multi-source heterogeneous data and integrating the strengths of diverse methods, the study employs the CRITIC method and the projection pursuit classification model to conduct both single-dimensional and comprehensive evaluations of the academic influence, perception, communication, and leadership of China’s AI discourse power. In the comprehensive evaluation, assessment is carried out separately for three major disciplines: computer science, chemistry, and environmental science. Finally, convolutional neural networks and correlation analysis are used to validate the evaluation results, robustly demonstrating the effectiveness of the proposed system in measuring China’s discourse power in AI in the international academic arena. This study aims to enrich and refine the theory and indicator system for evaluating China’s international academic discourse power in AI, thereby contributing to the construction of an independent knowledge system and enhancing China’s voice in global AI academic discourse.

Abstract:A political party’s image is shaped through its concrete historical practices and major events. Over the course of a century of struggle, the Communist Party of China has forged an overall image of being great, glorious and correct through solid work and a strong sense of responsibility. Therefore, starting with an analysis of major events in the Party’s history is both an indispensable and appropriate approach to studying the image-building of the Communist Party of China. Event System Theory takes events as its basic unit, revealing their uniqueness, scope and intensity of influence from the dimensions of strength, time and space, and driving changes in entities, the formation of new behaviors and characteristics, or the triggering of subsequent events. This paper applies this theory to examine why the Xiangjiang Battle is a worthy research subject and uses it as an entry point to deeply analyze the Party’s image demonstrated in this process: upholding ideals and convictions through bloody struggles, adhering to the original aspiration of serving and benefiting the people, and daring to correct mistakes and conduct self-revolution. Introducing Event System Theory into the study of Party history can break through the single framework of traditional grand narratives, establish a connection between the micro-analysis of specific events and the overall construction of the Party’s image, and provide a micro-level yet solid historical basis for understanding “why the Communist Party of China is capable”. Thus, this study represents a valuable exploration from both the perspective of the Xiangjiang Battle case and the research on the Party’s image-building.

Abstract:The daily life of the Red Army during the Long March was a process of establishing and sustaining a sense of normality amid an extraordinary historical period. Confronted with immense challenges, the Red Army externally faced continuous enemy encirclement and extreme natural conditions, while internally it had to overcome material shortages, injuries, illnesses, and ideological wavering. From the perspectives of personnel metabolism, resource procurement, and ideological cultivation, the Red Army strived to develop and implement a set of operable and sustainable daily management mechanisms under conditions of constant mobility and high instability. This mechanism became a crucial support for maintaining organizational functioning in extreme circumstances and offers an interpretation, from the perspective of daily life history, of the inner vitality of the Chinese Communist Party’s revolutionary organization.

Abstract:Academic research on grain work in the anti-Japanese base areas has clarified the grain institutional system in these areas, but has paid less attention to the practical implementation of these institutions. To explore how grain institutions were implemented at the grassroots level, this paper selects grain work in Mingzi Village as a micro case study. Mingzi Village is a mountainous village on the outskirts of Pingyao County, Shanxi Province, which belonged to the Taiyue Base Area during the War of Resistance Against Japan. Recently, a batch of account books from the anti-Japanese village office was discovered in the village. Based on the content of these account books, combined with relevant documents on grain work from the Taiyue District and Pingyao County, the development process of grain work in Mingzi Village can be reconstructed. In terms of burden distribution, Mingzi Village used estimation methods before and in 1942, with grain and funds allocated to households in a rather arbitrary manner. Between July and August 1943, the village implemented the rational burden method for the first time. Through investigations and democratic appraisals, burden scores were calculated, and the amounts of grain and funds for each household were determined accordingly. Although the investigation and appraisal that year were not thorough, with instances of income concealment and score suppression, subsequent investigations and appraisals were conducted multiple times. By 1945, the scoring process had become more in-depth and relatively fair. At this point, the village’s burden distribution transitioned from arbitrary allocation to a progressive taxation system. In terms of public grain collection, Mingzi Village achieved an efficient and orderly process in 1945. That year, summer grain, autumn grain, and fodder were all allocated based on burden scores, with each household’s share determined in advance. Once collection began, the task was completed quickly, with 90% of the public grain collected within 10 days, and the remaining arrears paid within two months. Regarding grain supply, starting in 1943, a large number of county- and district-level troops and cadres consumed grain in Mingzi Village. Initially, these county and district cadres mainly used IOUs for grain and ran up debts, failing to strictly adhere to grain regulations. Beginning in August, under strict supervision from the Taiyue District and enhanced management by the First District Office, most cadres shifted to using rice vouchers for grain procurement. The case of Mingzi Village illustrates that there were many gray areas in the grassroots implementation of grain institutions, such as score suppression during investigations and appraisals, as well as the use of IOUs for grain. However, through the management and oversight by the district office and other authorities, grain work in Mingzi Village was improved, achieving a considerable degree of institutionalization in links such as scoring, collection, and expenditure.

Abstract:The identification of corporate officers constitutes a major difficulty for courts in adjudicating disputes concerning liability for breach of fiduciary duties. For a long time, judicial practice has adopted two parallel approaches to this issue—formal criteria and substantive criteria. A more coherent solution should therefore be sought from the constituent elements of liability for breach of fiduciary duties. When adjudicating disputes involving breaches of fiduciary duties by directors, supervisors, and corporate officers, Chinese courts generally rely on the evaluative framework of general tort liability under the Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China. However, compared with the general tort liability regime, the liability rules for breach of fiduciary duties under the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China adopt a doctrinal structure in which unlawfulness absorbs fault, and contain a special constituent element concerning the identity of the liable subject. Consequently, unlike the method of examining the elements of general tort liability in parallel, the elements of liability stipulated in Article 188 of the Company Law follow a clear hierarchical order of review. The assessment of liability for breach of fiduciary duties should therefore be structured around fiduciary obligations, proceeding in the following sequence: the existence of a fiduciary relationship, the breach of fiduciary duties, and the occurrence of damage together with the causal link. Within this analytical framework, the question of who qualifies as a senior manager is essentially transformed into the question of who owes fiduciary duties to the company. The new Company Law strengthens the independent position of corporate managers in business decision-making by readjusting the allocation of powers between the shareholders’ meeting and the board of directors， thereby establishing a governance structure centered on managerial discretion. In terms of its normative logic, this institutional arrangement more closely resembles a fiduciary relationship rather than a traditional agency relationship. The key distinction between fiduciary relationships and agency relationships lies in the independent legal position of the fiduciary and the broad discretionary authority entrusted to them over the principal’s significant interests. Under a liability framework centered on fiduciary duties, the identification of corporate officers should follow a differentiated approach. According to statutory provisions, the general manager, deputy general managers, and the person in charge of financial affairs constitute statutory subjects who bear fiduciary duties, and their status should therefore be determined according to formal criteria. For individuals other than these three categories, a substantive standard should be applied. In judicial practice, however, the tendency to identify corporate officers solely on the basis of decision-making power or managerial authority conflates fiduciary relationships with agency relationships. A shift is therefore required—from a focus on powers and functions to an assessment of the nature of the legal relationship. Specifically, courts should concentrate on two core factors in individual cases. First, whether the individual exercises authority with genuine independence, that is, whether his decisions stem from his own professional judgment rather than from the execution of explicit and specific instructions issued by superiors. Second, whether the company is placed in a position of structural vulnerability due to the individual’s position within the organizational hierarchy, such that the company cannot effectively constrain their conduct through contractual arrangements or internal governance mechanisms.

Abstract:The deep involvement of generative AI (GenAI) in content production has severely impacted the existing internet copyright legal framework, making the allocation of infringement liability for GenAI service providers a core challenge that urgently needs to be addressed. As the cornerstone of balancing technological innovation and copyright protection in the internet era, the safe harbor rules are currently facing a severe test regarding their applicability to this new subject. This paper conducts an in-depth exploration of this issue from the perspective of the suitability of infringing subjects.From the history of institutional evolution, the application of the safe harbor rules highly depends on the suitability of subjects, having undergone the separation of internet service providers (ISPs) and internet content providers (ICPs), as well as the rise of content service providers. However, GenAI technology has achieved a leap from discovering information to reorganizing information and even creating information. GenAI service providers directly participate in the content production process, breaking the neutrality premise of traditional ISPs that do not participate in content creation. Meanwhile, because its content generation is subject to user instructions, and the cross-modal, large-scale production makes it difficult to trace the source of the content, it cannot be classified as an ICP within the meaning of copyright law. Therefore, the traditional dual-subject framework of internet service providers and content providers has fallen into a dilemma of applicability in the GenAI era.If GenAI service providers are forcibly regarded as traditional ISPs and the existing safe harbor rules are directly applied, it will plunge them into a dilemma of compliance. On the one hand, constrained by the technological essence of GenAI as a pen rather than paper, it cannot fulfill the duty of care to prevent the dissemination of infringing works. On the other hand, since AI-generated content is generated in real-time based on parameters rather than stored in a database in advance, service providers are technically unable to take necessary measures such as disconnecting links or deleting content under the notice and takedown rules. Therefore, the key to breaking the deadlock lies in abandoning the patching approach and legally recognizing GenAI service providers as a brand-new, independent liable subject. In determining their infringement liability, the focus should shift from the traditional safe harbor rules’ presumption of actual knowledge （informed or not) regarding dissemination to the standard of knowability (knowable or not) regarding content generation.Based on this, this paper proposes that a new AI safe harbor rule exclusively tailored for such subjects should be scientifically introduced and reconstructed within the framework of content producer liability under the Interim Measures for the Management of Generative Artificial Intelligence Services. Specifically, it includes three core mechanisms: First, establishing an AI training exemption mechanism, explicitly treating the technical processing behavior of using lawful works for model training as non-infringing use. Second, establishing a knowable exemption rule, requiring providers to ensure that the generated content and its sources are in a knowable state by adding visible and invisible watermarks and providing source retrieval links, and using this as a basis for liability apportionment and defense. Third, establishing a circumvention exemption rule, encouraging service providers to proactively deviate from training data through model optimization, rewriting, and security assessments to evade infringement risks. The construction of this set of brand-new rules aims to effectively maintain the institutional balance of the existing copyright order while safeguarding the continuous innovative development of GenAI technology.

Abstract:The subject of generative artificial intelligence is built on relatively sophisticated neural network technology. Driven by the deep learning of pre-trained data and human feedback data, it exhibits unprecedented human-like attributes and inexplicability in both its generation process and terminal manifestations. From the perspective of criminal law, the risks posed by generative artificial intelligence can be subdivided into two dimensions: endogenous criminal risks created by generative artificial intelligence subject itself in the absence of external behavioral intervention, and exogenous criminal risks induced by external factors. Criminal law intervention in both the endogenous and exogenous risks of generative artificial intelligence demands a prudent response, and the value orientation of criminal law should be established on the basis of weighing the values of balancing development and security. An absolute bias toward either the positive criminal law view or the negative criminal law view is inherently limited. Instead, we should adhere to the more appropriate adaptive criminal law view, that is, on the premise of upholding the position of criminal law as a guarantee law, we oppose hasty legislative regulation of the criminal risks induced by generative artificial intelligence to avoid curbing the development dividends of the digital economy era due to excessive expansion of the scope of crimes. Meanwhile, we must keep a close watch on the iterative evolution of generative artificial intelligence and actively adjust traditional criminal law theories to address the potential negative harms it may cause. In the debate between instrumentalism and subjectivism, it is necessary to clarify the inaccuracy of pure instrumentalism and pure subjectivism in defining the attributes of generative artificial intelligence. At the current stage, we should neither overstate its degree of autonomy by treating it as an independent subject of criminal liability, nor adhere to traditional views rigidly by regarding it merely as a passive tool. Under the correct guidance of the adaptive criminal law view, facing the inadequacy of the traditional criminal law causality theory in responding to generative artificial intelligence, we should conduct an in-depth analysis of the causal relationships arising from interactive participation, emphasize the pivotal position of the causative force theory in the traditional criminal law causality theory, and reveal the specific manifestations of causative force relationships in the process of criminal law imputation amid the impact of criminal risks posed by generative artificial intelligence. On this basis, by further expanding the scope of subjects bearing causative force, incorporating behavioral correlation into the scope of causative force judgment, and distinguishing the degrees and types of causative force, we should conduct an adaptive and objective interpretation of the causal relationships between the acts of relevant subjects involved in criminal risks of generative artificial intelligence, the operation of generative artificial intelligence, and the harmful consequences thereby caused, through the innovation and reconstruction of criminal law theories in the digital and intelligent era. This lays a theoretical foundation for the dynamic criminal law regulation of generative artificial intelligence and properly addresses the challenges posed by generative artificial intelligence to criminal law imputation.

Abstract:Reorganization value must be allocated pursuant to clear rules that determine the order in which different stakeholders’ rights are realized. The absolute priority rule (APR), which prioritizes unsecured creditors over equity holders, has become the foundational rule for distributive order in reorganization. It is grounded in respect for substantive-law entitlements and pre-insolvency interests, and serves to constrain debtors’ self-serving incentives. From the perspective of interest-balancing theory, however, the APR’s one-dimensional pursuit of creditor value maximization tends to convert the relationship between creditors and shareholders into a zero-sum game: strict adherence often results in the complete exclusion or deprivation of shareholder interests. The APR thus weakens the role of shareholders in corporate governance, resource coordination, and the preservation of going-concern value, even though such influence may be a decisive condition for achieving reorganization goals in the context of micro and small enterprises (SMEs). In SMEs reorganizations, the core value sustaining the firm’s survival often lies less in capital than in human resources. Accordingly, reorganization strategies that primarily rely on third-party capital injections frequently fail to maximize operating value. Even where external funding is available, applying the APR rigidly can severely undermine shareholders’ incentives to participate in the reorganization, thereby causing the debtor to lose its core competitiveness and ultimately leading to reorganization failure—contrary to the bankruptcy law’s fundamental objective of rescuing distressed enterprises. Therefore, for SMEs, the APR requires a systematic recalibration. This involves shifting its objective from solely protecting creditors to serving the broader goal of enterprise rescue, and methodologically, replacing the exclusion of shareholders with equity-retention arrangements to incentivize their participation. In this regard, China’s newly released Draft Amendment to the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law (the “Draft”） breaks with the APR’s rigidity for the first time by introducing the expected disposable income standard as a new paradigm for balancing the interests of SMEs shareholders and creditors, with the aim of enhancing the effectiveness of relief and rescue mechanisms for SMEs. The expected disposable income standard and the new value exception are aligned in their pursuit of the institutional interest of rescue: both seek to create room for preserving shareholder interests in order to facilitate value creation consistent with SMEs’ operational logic. Compared with the new value exception—which constrains shareholder new value contributions and entails uncertainty in both commitment and verification—the expected disposable income standard, by structuring repayment around the debtor’s future income stream, better satisfies the proportionality principle of being most conducive to rescue while minimizing impairment to creditor interests. It therefore represents a more rational choice that reconciles fairness with efficiency. To safeguard unsecured creditors’ repayment expectations， on the basis of the Draft， China should further clarify the debtors’ repayment term and the methodology for calculating disposable income. In addition， supporting measures should be established， including reasonable adjustments to account for fluctuations in actual income and incentive-constraint mechanisms for reorganization plan performance, so as to foster a virtuous interaction between debt repayment and corporate rescue.

Abstract:The report of the 20th CPC National Congress emphasizes the urgent need to vigorously promote ecological civilization construction and calls for a more robust institutional system for ecological civilization. The system of evaluation and responsibility investigation to build ecological civilization is identified as a crucial safeguard in China’s efforts to advance this cause. Responsive law of this system must be constructed based on the actual circumstances of ecological civilization construction in China. Responsive law centers on achieving public objectives, viewing social pressure as a source of knowledge and an opportunity for self-correction. This kind of law seeks to infuse the spirit of self-correction into government operations, serving as a flexible means of social regulation that adapts to social changes, actively responds to social needs, and promotes substantive justice. From the perspective of responsive law, the system of law of evaluation and responsibility investigation to build ecological civilization needs to be open, cognitive, and dynamic, to realize self-correction of this system, adapt to the green transformation of economic and social development in China, actively respond to demands to protect the environment in the new era and realize ecological justice. Because of the demand to correct views of development, political achievement, and people’s livelihood, responsive law of evaluation and responsibility investigation to build ecological civilization will be established in China at the right time from three key perspectives: national development goals, governmental performance metrics, and citizen welfare considerations. China has made strides in establishing normative foundations for the system of law of evaluation and responsibility investigation to build ecological civilization in Ecological Environment Code. A system featuring an emphasis on resource conservation, environmental friendliness, and ecological conservation has formed for leadership cadre assessments during their tenure or audits upon departure from office or lifelong accountability measures. Furthermore, exploratory steps have been taken towards implementing rule-of-law practices related to assessing responsibility within this domain. However, challenges persist within China’s rule-of-law practice concerning the system of law of evaluation and responsibility investigation to build ecological civilization. These include a tendency toward specificity, consequentialism and homogeneity. Additionally, concerns arise regarding how normative documents impact legal stability, how intra-Party regulations influence legal coordination, and how local legislation affects universality. Given that only a rigorous system underpinned by meticulous adherence can provide reliable guarantees for promoting eco-civilization development, it is suggested that the evaluation and responsibility investigation system should adopt a rule-of-law orientation of comprehensiveness, processuality and differentiation. To achieve a sound responsive rule of law for evaluation and responsibility investigation to build ecological civilization and help advance ecological civilization construction to a new stage in the new era, efforts should be made to complete the paradigm shift from policy-driven progress to rule-of-law guidance, promote the coordination and alignment between intra-Party regulations and national laws, and advance the enactment and refinement of universal norms at the national level as a unified approach to the rule of law.

Abstract:The question of whether the concept of legal interests should include moral interests has long been debated in the academic community. With in-depth academic discussions on whether criminal law legislation should be expanded and how criminal law intervenes in cutting-edge technological fields such as metaverse, it has become more relevant to explore whether spiritual legal interests should be protected by criminal law. A historical review reveals that spiritual legal interests began to emerge under the influence of Enlightenment thought, and became established under the influence of neo-Kantian legal philosophy. Influenced by the concept of material legal interests after the Second World War, the recognition of spiritual legal interests has gradually receded, and legal interests have trended toward materialization. However, no matter in the early development of spiritual interests or the late transmutation, they are always an important part of the concept of legal interests. Even the firm supporters of material legal interests have not denied the existence of spiritual interests. Given that legal interests constitute the core of criminal law theory, a moderate spiritualization tendency of legal interests should be tolerated in criminal law legislation. The existence of spiritual legal interests has justification basis: from a social foundation perspective, insisting on the concept of pure material legal interests is difficult to cope with the challenges of the risk society, which leads to loopholes in the scope of protection of criminal law; from a legal rationale perspective, the provisions of the constitution and the criminal law require the protection of spiritual legal interests; from a criminal policy perspective, modern functionalist criminal policy emphasizes early prevention and control of risks, and requires that legal interests should be continuously extended and changed in terms of quantity, scope and degree of detail. However, undue expansion of spiritual interests also carries certain dangers, such as affecting the functioning of legal guidance, creating an authoritarian style of criminal law, and leading to the proliferation of symbolic legislation. Therefore, we should neither deny the existence of spiritual legal interests, nor allow their blind expansion. To construct a restrictive path of criminal law protection of spiritual legal interests, firstly, the humanism of criminal law protection of spiritual legal interests should be adhered to, with human beings as the foundation, taking human interests as the starting point and landing point, and interests indirectly related to human interests cannot become spiritual legal interests protected by criminal law, so as to prevent the decline of the guiding function of legal interests. Secondly, the constitutional review of the criminal law protection of spiritual legal interests should be strengthened to ensure that the purpose and means of the criminal law protection of spiritual legal interests are justified, and at the same time, the criminal law protection of spiritual legal interests should be weighed in terms of legal interests, so as to prevent the rise of authoritarianism of the criminal law. Lastly, in light of the current legislative status of criminal law protection for spiritual legal interests, the degree of correlation between spiritual legal interests and vital human survival interests as well as the national moral bottom line should be examined, so as to prevent excessive symbolic legislation.

Abstract:Accelerating agricultural and rural modernization to better promote the construction of Chinese modernization lies in strengthening the research on the ideological traits of Chinese characteristics. Chinese agricultural and rural modernization takes the modernization of agriculture with high quality and high efficiency as the support point, the modernization of rural areas with livable and workable countryside as the focus point, the modernization of farmers with rich and prosperous farmers as the starting point, and the integration of urban and rural areas as the link between the modernization of agriculture, modernization of rural areas, and modernization of farmers. It is characterized by the modernization of small farmers on a huge scale, the modernization of common prosperity for all farmers, the modernization of new quality productivity enabling the overall upgrading of agriculture, the overall progress of rural areas and the overall development of farmers, and the modernization of the harmonious coexistence of people-industry-ecology, and the modernization of peace, development, cooperation and win-win situation. The Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee stressed that agricultural and rural modernization has a major bearing on Chinese modernization as a whole and the outcomes it delivers.The period of the 15th Five-Year Plan is at a new historical starting point for the integrated development of urban and rural areas, the new rural collective economy should achieve an important transformation in terms of element interoperability, spatial reshaping and pattern innovation. By organizing small farmers to connect with big production, big market and big country, it builds modern agriculture, guides efficient market and creates effective government, forming an outer-cycle mechanism to resolve structural contradictions; at the same time, it is embedded in the economic symbiosis mechanism and collective co-governance mode to guide the modernization of farmers, forming an inner-cycle mechanism centred on fostering the main strength of farmers. The internal and external circular mechanism constructed by the new rural collective economy empowered by the integrated development of urban and rural areas is a guarantee for the promotion of Chinese agricultural and rural modernization. Giving full play to the advantages of the new rural collective economy in the process of integrated urban-rural development is a feasible way to promote Chinese agricultural and rural modernization. First, we must adhere to the leadership of the Communist Party of China over the new rural collective economy and strengthen the political guarantee of Chinese agricultural and rural modernization. Second, we should insist on comprehensively deepening the reform of the new rural collective economy to empower the high-quality development of Chinese agricultural and rural modernization. Third, we should adhere to the integration of education, science and technology, and talents to optimize the key driving force of Chinese agricultural and rural modernization. Fourth, it is necessary to adhere to the green orientation of the new rural collective economy and develop the new quality productivity of Chinese agricultural and rural modernization.

Abstract:The construction of a digital government is an important component of Digital China, and the introduction of artificial intelligence models is of great significance. From a technological perspective, artificial intelligence models provide hierarchical interactions for the construction of a digital government: at the structural level, artificial intelligence models expand the multidimensional functions of digital government; at the decision-making level, artificial intelligence models improve the operational efficiency of digital government; at the behavioral level, artificial intelligence models enhance the law enforcement accuracy of digital government. From a risk perspective, artificial intelligence models also have multifaceted impacts on digital government construction. Firstly, technological hegemony, monopoly, and the automatic information acquisition by artificial intelligence models have eroded data sovereignty and further endangered national security. Secondly, capital alienation caused by the application of artificial intelligence models will exert social impacts and undermine the achievements of China’s social development. Lastly, the information order that cannot cope with the impact of artificial intelligence models faces the risk of disorder, and the security boundaries such as individual rights may be violated. In view of this, the first step is to solidify the foundation of the rule of law. First, legal incentives should be adopted to promote the development of generative artificial intelligence systems with independent innovation capabilities. Second, combined with a data classification system, generative artificial intelligence systems should be developed to ensure compliant production. Third, it is important to achieve a legally compliant relationship structure and construct generative artificial intelligence systems with a clear allocation of rights and responsibilities. Fourth, it is necessary to seek overarching principles and design generative artificial intelligence systems that adhere to ethical standards. Additionally, complementary regulatory frameworks need to be established. Legislative bodies should fulfill the duty of risk prevention in advance, law enforcement agencies should bear the responsibility of eliminating infringements during implementation, and judicial authorities should assume the obligation of providing remedies for rights violations.